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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 9 December 1992, the General Assembly adopted decision 47/422, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". In paragraph (b) of that decision, the General Assembly, inter alia, decided to invite Member States to provide their views on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7) no later than 31 January 1993, and to request the Secretary-General to submit a compilation of those views to the Assembly for consideration at the reconvened meetings of the First Committee.

2. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General sent a note verbale dated 16 December 1992 to Member States inviting them to submit their views in accordance with the above-mentioned decision.

3. To date, the Secretary-General has received replies from 23 Member States. Additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

Algeria

[Original: French]

[29 January 1993]

1. The Algerian Government has studied with interest the Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". It is grateful to him for his commendable and continuous efforts on behalf of the cause of disarmament.

2. The Algerian Government supports the view that the changed international environment creates new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament and that there should be a global re-evaluation of the tasks and methods used in the past.

3. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the achievements in this area have often been the result of a hard-won consensus within the community of nations which culminated in the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the view of the Algerian Government, this document should be the basis for any step taken, particularly in the context of the three concepts - integration, globalization and revitalization - advocated by the Secretary-General for the continuation of the disarmament process. In this respect, the priorities set out in this document remain valid and need to be reaffirmed.

4. With regard to integration, the Algerian Government shares the view that the question of disarmament should be included in a broader context which, with the development of a new system of international relations, also incorporates the need for security and the improvement of economic conditions. Algeria has constantly called for recognition of the close relationship between disarmament, security and development. The efforts to build a new system of international relations must at the same time be directed towards these three elements, which constitute the true foundations of peace.

5. Recently, the United Nations has increasingly been called upon to carry out peacemaking and peace-keeping operations. While the arms regulation and disarmament measures taken in this context may help defuse conflicts, which would in itself be a significant achievement, they relate to peripheral conflicts which can always re-emerge because of latent underlying causes. The disarmament measures taken, in such cases, must therefore take into account these underlying causes, regional characteristics and the balancing necessary for the preservation of world peace.

6. Another means of conflict resolution discussed in the report - peace enforcement - gives rise to some ambiguity, since it is hard for a peace imposed by force to be a lasting peace. The disarmament measures advocated in this context are likely to generate frustration and resentment which would increase the feeling of injustice, one of the main causes of breaches of the peace.

7. With regard to globalization, Algeria supports the idea that disarmament should involve all regions of the world and that the multilateral approach should be strengthened in order to involve the entire international community in implementing and, above all, formulating decisions.

8. Viewed in this manner, globalization could help promote confidence-building measures which, as noted in the Secretary-General's report, are the source of much of the progress made in the field of disarmament. However, the idea of moving forward in the disarmament process by concentric circles, while useful, cannot be a substitute for a global approach which implies a voluntary commitment on the part of all members of the international community. And while improvement in a given region is perhaps a necessary condition, it is not sufficient to promote progress at the global level. Indeed, objectively speaking, the reverse is more likely. Under these circumstances, one can legitimately question the value of conventional disarmament in a given region when there is no likelihood of progress in respect of weapons of mass destruction at either the global or the regional level.

9. As noted in the Secretary-General's report, all possible efforts must be made to create conditions in the various regions of the world which would enable more States to undertake disarmament commitments, by mutual example or reciprocated unilateral measures, in a manner similar to that which has characterized the relations between the two major military Powers.

10. With regard to revitalization, Algeria endorses the Secretary-General's recommendations concerning the building of a new system of international security, subject to a correct interpretation of the so-called new phenomena related to security. For Algeria, security has never been defined solely in military terms, but must necessarily, and to an equal extent, be conceived in economic, social and cultural terms. To be both credible and effective, revitalization must be imbued with the spirit of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and thus give priority once again to the disarmament agenda, tackling the most dangerous weapons first.

11. Algeria continues to endorse the idea that priority should be accorded to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and, in keeping with that belief, was one of the original signatories of the Convention on chemical weapons.

12. In the nuclear field, it is reassuring to note the commitments undertaken by the two largest nuclear Powers to reduce their strategic and tactical arsenals, yet the possibility remains that this process will not involve other nuclear States or cover related measures on the improvement of nuclear weapons or the halting of nuclear tests. Now is the time to reaffirm support for the efforts made to resume the work of the Conference to amend the 1963 Moscow Treaty in order to make it a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The moratoriums on nuclear tests introduced by certain States are a positive and encouraging step in this direction.

13. On the subject of non-proliferation, it would be prudent to make 1995, when the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to be held, an occasion for promoting the universality of this instrument by enhancing its provisions. This could be done by righting the imbalance between the rights and obligations of States parties, by strengthening cooperation aimed at providing non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and by honouring the commitments undertaken by the nuclear Powers under this Treaty.

14. The questions of conventional arms transfers and transparency need to be considered together because of the nature and origin of transfers. The system that is set up with a view to viability and objectivity must be global and non-discriminatory in order to promote genuine openness and transparency. The extension of this system to include questions of production, stockpiling and technology transfers would be useful in this respect, and it is to be hoped that the Conference on Disarmament will achieve results that are acceptable to all.

15. The machinery established within the United Nations to deal with disarmament questions has performed its assigned tasks within the limitations imposed by the political climate of the period. In some cases, the lack of progress cannot be attributed to the machinery itself but to a lack of political will to negotiate. The role of the General Assembly must be assessed in the light of Article 11 of the Charter, which entrusts it with the task of formulating principles and recommendations on disarmament and the

regulation of armaments. The Disarmament Commission has made progress since it was last reorganized in 1990. As to the Conference on Disarmament, which remains the only multilateral forum in the area of disarmament, its role should be strengthened in the context of the globalization advocated in the Secretary-General's report. At the same time, it is the forum in which the two other principles of integration and revitalization could be formalized for dealing with the most urgent questions. It is to be hoped that the recent conclusion of the Convention on Chemical Weapons will serve as a stimulus for the future work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in respect of questions of nuclear disarmament, nuclear tests and security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

16. If the machinery has yet to meet the hopes placed in it, the new international climate can provide new impetus by making available resources freed by the ending of the cold war.

17. In conclusion, Algeria wishes to reiterate its conviction that the new world environment affords better opportunities for effectively resolving the problem of disarmament by promoting the advent of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. It wishes to renew its commitment to a global approach to disarmament questions so as to promote equal security for all.

Australia

[Original: English]

[3 February 1993]

Reform of the First Committee

1. The First Committee has undergone a process of considerable reform already in recent years, which has increased its effectiveness. There have been fewer resolutions with more consensus. The merger of the discussion on disarmament and security in the First Committee was a positive move. We would support further moves to merge similar discussions, texts and resolutions. We would also support reform of the First Committee agenda to avoid repetition of items, remove items from the past, extend the use of sunset clauses in resolutions and put some order in the now seemingly random agenda. In our view, the continuing non-utilization by the First Committee of a significant portion of its available session time (especially in the first week) strongly suggests work could be compressed by up to one week without prejudice to the effectiveness of the session: in the interests of efficient use of resources, such a compression should be pursued.

2. The nomination of a theme for a session of the First Committee might also be a useful way to put some more logical order into First Committee proceedings, but there are limitations to this. The First Committee essentially has to address topical issues if it is to be relevant.

Reform of the United Nations Disarmament Commission

3. The United Nations Disarmament Commission provides a wider forum for all members of the United Nations to explore in depth principles and guidelines for disarmament. This work can be valuable and could contribute to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, but in order to be effective the United Nations Disarmament Commission needs to set specific work goals and produce substantive recommendations.

4. In 1992 the United Nations Disarmament Commission was more positive and constructive than in previous years. Comparatively there were less polemics, more active participation and debate was more relevant and to the point, but there is still much room for improvement in attitude. However, we believe that:

(a) Greater pre-United Nations Disarmament Commission consultation and consultations in the margins should be encouraged to ensure that deliberations during the Commission result in concrete recommendations;

(b) The conclusion of items could be staggered to take the pressure off States to conclude more than one item in a year.

Reform of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs

5. At the moment the resources of the Office of Disarmament Affairs are stretched too thin. The Office is doing some good work, for example, with the register of conventional arms transfers, but it should be in a position to take advantage of the disarmament opportunities occurring in the post-cold-war era by taking some positive action. This is a time of expanding not contracting arms control opportunities and needs. While we are not in favour of raising the Secretariat's overall budget nor do we consider that significant reduction in the resources assigned to the Office of Disarmament Affairs would be consistent with the disarmament commitments of the Secretary-General or Member States, and with the desire to capitalize on the disarmament opportunities presented by the current international climate. In this context we are concerned about the reallocation of Office of Disarmament Affairs staff to other areas of Secretariat responsibility. We would hope the Office could maintain its full complement of staff for the tasks for which it is responsible.

Reform of the Conference on Disarmament

6. We are flexible about how the Conference on Disarmament approaches reform of itself. Generally speaking there are three areas that need addressing:

(a) Membership;

(b) Agenda;

(c) Work practices.

(a) Membership

7. Membership reform is urgently needed and we hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to reach a decision on reform during 1993. Broadly speaking there are four options for membership of the Conference:

(a) The admission to the Conference on Disarmament as full participants of all States that are interested and are prepared to commit the resources to contribute effectively;

(b) Expansion of the membership by a limited number perhaps on the basis of current observers;

(c) Maintenance of the membership at approximately 40 members but reviewing the current membership in the light of new political realities;

(d) Maintenance of the status quo without a review of current membership.

(b) Agenda

8. In our view a number of the existing agenda items remain highly relevant to the multilateral agenda:

(a) Nuclear testing;

(b) Conventional arms transfers;

(c) Negative security assurances;

(d) The prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. In our view some other items on the agenda, such as the comprehensive programme on disarmament, have outlived their relevance and usefulness. A new agenda would, we hope, be without these broad-ranging and therefore unsuitable issues.

(c) Work practices

10. Another problem with the Conference on Disarmament has been its work practices. A clearly identifiable problem with the work of the Conference has been the lack of deadlines for any of the agenda items. One possibility might be a deadline for it to conclude negotiation on any given item. If agreement is not met by the deadline, it can then either be shelved or alternative means such as taking the text to the United Nations and the international community at large without consensus support could be pursued.

Austria

[Original: English]

[3 February 1993]

1. The Government of Austria considers the report of the Secretary-General, "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), timely and appropriate.

2. Austria shares the Secretary-General's opinion that, at a time when a changed international environment has made possible substantial reductions of armaments in bilateral negotiations and international relations are marked by a new atmosphere of détente and cooperation, new opportunities have also arisen for multilateral disarmament efforts.

3. To meet this new challenge the international community requires a functioning and efficient multilateral arms regulation and disarmament machinery.

4. Austria shares the Secretary-General's assessment that in the present international security concept traditional approaches to arms control and disarmament constitute but one aspect within an integrated framework, which includes multifaceted political and economic issues on global, regional and subregional levels. Austria supports the Secretary-General's call for new strategies in the solution of these problems.

5. In this context we attach particular importance to confidence-building as a precondition for effective disarmament. We recall a number of seminars organized recently in Austria, in cooperation with the United Nations, on this subject, particularly the United Nations Seminar on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures held at Vienna from 25 to 27 February 1991, the International Round-Table Conference on Preventive Conflict Management, held at Vienna from 25 to 27 January 1993, and the seminar scheduled for Graz, Austria, from 2 to 4 June 1993, on the subject of confidence- and security-building measures in preventive diplomacy.

6. Austria also strongly supports the Secretary-General's call for cooperation of all States, on a global, regional and subregional level, in the prevention of the proliferation of arms of mass destruction, and pledges its continued full cooperation and support for these efforts.

7. Austria agrees with the Secretary-General's suggestion that the time has come to reassess the international disarmament machinery and to re-evaluate its capacities to meet new realities and priorities promptly, flexibly and efficiently.

8. In this context we propose the following views:

(a) The General Assembly (First Committee) has been and should continue to be the main multilateral forum for the consideration of all disarmament and arms control issues. If efforts to further streamline the agenda and to concentrate the workload continue, and if the constructive spirit of cooperation that has marked recent sessions can be maintained, we feel justified to expect further fruitful results from its work.

(b) The United Nations Disarmament Commission, after implementing its reform programme, can play an important role as deliberative forum on disarmament. Its mandate to address important issues that are not yet defined sufficiently to be taken up by negotiations will also be relevant in the future. By focusing on concrete topics it will enhance its efficiency while, at the same time, providing all interested States with the opportunity to participate in and to contribute to its work.

(c) The Conference on Disarmament has served effectively as multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It proved its value only recently in the elaboration and completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. With the completion of this important treaty, a new phase will begin for the work of the Conference. This must be a moment to review its agenda and its composition.

Austria strongly believes that the Conference on Disarmament would, at this moment, benefit greatly from the addition of a number of countries willing and able to make substantial contributions.

This point of view seems to be widely shared. In the discussions of the First Committee last autumn, the delegation of the United Kingdom, speaking as president and on behalf of the European Community, stated: "We support an early enlargement of the membership, which would more adequately reflect the level of interest in its work on the part of the international community as a whole" (A/C.1/47/PV.29).

Likewise, the non-aligned countries, at the 10th Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, called for an enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, informal consultations of Conference on Disarmament members in late 1992 revealed that there is now a significant trend in the Conference itself in favour of a substantial expansion.

Austria takes this opportunity to recall its strong and long-standing interest in becoming a member of the Conference on Disarmament. Ever since non-members were given the possibility to participate in the work of the Conference, Austria has been granted the status of "participating non-member", and over the years Austria has actively participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament through numerous interventions, working papers, and so on.

Austria submitted its formal application for Conference on Disarmament membership as early as 1982. We trust that it will now be possible to respond favourably to this application. As to the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, we share the Secretary-General's point of view that it should focus its efforts on well defined and urgent issues. We believe that foremost amongst these issues should be negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(d) The Security Council has in the recent past reconfirmed and strengthened its role as the central organ for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.

Austria supports a more active involvement by the Security Council also in the areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

We recall in this connection that the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons provides in its article XII, paragraph 4, that grave contraventions against the provisions of the Convention be submitted to the Security Council. We believe that the Council should consider, at the appropriate time, a catalogue of conceivable and concrete steps that could be taken, if the case arises, against a country found in contravention and unwilling to respond to measures available to the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Bulgaria

[Original: English]

[21 January 1993]

1. Bulgaria welcomes the submission of the United Nations Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era".

2. The Government of Bulgaria has studied the report and has been able to confirm its initial impression that this initiative is a timely response to the widely shared wish of Member States that a decisive impetus should be given to arms control activities within the United Nations from the perspective of a new vision of its role and important place in the efforts to strengthen international peace, security and stability.

3. Bulgaria considers the report of the Secretary-General a valuable contribution to the efforts of the international community to explore the new dimensions of arms control and disarmament negotiations in a changing world and to draw the necessary conclusions, with a view to making the global disarmament machinery more efficient.

4. Bulgaria shares the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his report that disarmament is centrally relevant to international security needs. It remains one of the basic pillars of the global efforts to maintain peace and

security in post-cold-war times. As the Secretary-General pointed out in his presentation of the report to the First Committee on 28 October 1992, the end of bipolarity has not diminished the need for disarmament, but rather it has increased it.

5. Bulgaria believes that the three concepts suggested in the "New dimensions" report - integration, globalization and revitalization - could indeed be the foundation stones of an enhanced international effort in the field of arms regulation and disarmament. These three perspectives of reassessment are particularly needed and adequate at the present moment in history. In trying to adapt the tasks of arms control to the new political environment the Secretary-General's report offers new contents of these concepts, introduced at a time when they seem realistically applicable, provided that concerted and well focused actions are taken.

6. Arms control efforts should increasingly be integrated into a broader world agenda, reflecting the need for a more comprehensive approach to security and of focusing on new disarmament priorities. Areas of international concern, which seem now increasingly relevant to concerted efforts to maintain peace and common security, include settlement of regional conflicts by peaceful means; curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is a threat to international peace and security; building mutual confidence through self-restraint and coordinated steps to promote transparency in armaments and transfers of high technologies with military application.

7. Disarmament measures, particularly verification and inspection procedures, play an important part in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. At the same time, disarmament remains a highly specialized and separate field, which relies on an independently functioning machinery. The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral negotiating forum on global disarmament agreements, which has to be preserved and its agenda renewed in a manner that would fully address the new arms control priorities in the post-cold-war world.

8. Disarmament is of global concern. All States should be engaged in the process of disarmament. Arms regulations should have a truly universal scope if they are to achieve their basic purposes. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the recently concluded ban of chemical weapons are only two out of numerous examples that illustrate the need for a global approach. Regional arms control and disarmament efforts also retain their relevance to security and local stability.

9. Unilateral actions - both global and regional - of self-restraint, mutual example and promotion of public awareness of the costs and benefits of weapons acquisition, complement efforts to negotiate legally binding agreements. They open an important avenue to building confidence, thus contributing to greater stability and common security in the world.

10. Appropriate weight should be given by the international community to all undertakings providing for arms control and disarmament - unilateral actions, bilateral agreements and multilateral arrangements at both regional and global levels.

11. Revitalization of disarmament is another key word in the new security environment, which suggests that efforts should continue to ensure the viability of all existing disarmament agreements as a starting point for further strengthening their implementation and extending their scope of application. Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should be indefinitely extended in 1995, is a most important objective in this respect.

12. Bulgaria endorses the ideas raised in the report of the Secretary-General that promoting transparency in armaments, especially through the United Nations register of conventional arms, is of considerable importance and a significant step towards creating effective international machinery for promoting arms control and disarmament, as well as strengthening regional and global security.

13. The correlation between disarmament measures and economic development has drawn more attention over recent years as democratic trends influence development. This emerging issue highlights the immediate need for post-disarmament efforts as economies and Governments try to transform military-oriented industrial complexes into enterprises serving social, humanitarian and development requirements. Eastern European countries in particular, which are now undergoing a major transition from a centrally planned to a free market economy, feel the urgency of dealing with these new challenges.

14. In this context, the Secretary-General's report correctly points to the three major problems standing out in terms of urgency and complexity - the safe destruction and storage of armaments resulting from disarmament agreements; conversion of military capacity to peaceful uses; and adequate technical and financial facilities to complete the transition in a balanced manner.

15. Bulgaria welcomes the readiness of the United Nations expressed in the Secretary-General's report to assist Member States in exploring these concepts. The United Nations is indeed one of the most appropriate forums to foster cooperation on this matter so that effective ways could be found to deal with it. Advanced economies should share their expertise and experience in this area with other nations.

16. A number of Eastern European countries in transition have already entered the difficult process of dealing with issues related to the conversion of military industry to civilian purposes as part of the dialogue going on within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. While fully supporting these activities, Bulgaria also appreciates conversion-related bilateral contacts with countries with experience and active interest in exploring the

possibilities of establishing joint ventures or other kinds of cooperation of mutual interest.

17. Bulgaria looks forward to benefiting from the forms of cooperation that might be developed within the United Nations global mechanisms. In this context, Bulgaria cannot but support the appeal of the Secretary-General in his report to all Member States to consider methods to alleviate the problems of the painful transition to a post-disarmament world.

18. The conceptual basis provided by this report should be followed by actions undertaken both by Governments and the United Nations Secretariat that could stabilize the institutions supporting the arms control-related activities as seen in the new perspectives. The United Nations is indeed confronted today with an entirely new set of problems rightly referred to in the report as "post-disarmament issues".

19. Bulgaria endorses the announced establishment of an interdepartmental task force at the United Nations to provide Member States with political, technical and economic advice on the various aspects involved in such a transition. It looks forward to making use of the first substantive results of the work of this important group.

20. With regard to the section of the Secretary-General's report dealing with the new machinery of disarmament, Bulgaria holds the view that the new challenges of the present time require integrated methods and approaches in addressing the issues involved. As the United Nations was created in the course of the cold war, its mechanisms should, no doubt, be reassessed. There is a need of a coordinated system that would allow the international community to address major disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently.

21. Bulgaria supports the efforts of the international community and the United Nations Secretary-General in making the United Nations an organization that is better equipped to meet adequately the new challenges of the post-cold-war era.

22. The idea of a greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, particularly in the enforcement of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deserves full endorsement as part of the overall reform of the United Nations, which has many interrelated aspects. The Summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 marked a major event indicating the enhanced role of this supreme organ of the international community for the maintenance and restoration of peace and security, for the management of crises and the enforcement of international non-proliferation norms.

23. The new spirit of operation of the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs is a basic achievement ensuring increased effectiveness of work. The three multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies - the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee of the General Assembly, and the United Nations Disarmament Commission - have interrelated and mutually complementary functions.

24. The Disarmament Commission remains the major deliberative body for a focused and detailed discussion of a limited agenda without the pressures of voting. The Commission should complete the process of streamlining its proceedings and concentrating on few concrete subjects of deliberation.

25. The growing sense of consensus in the First Committee and the trend to concentrate on forward-looking and practical approaches to disarmament have to be sustained and actively supported. Its basic role should remain in the area of identifying priorities on the multilateral agenda and building momentum to promote the urgent issues of arms control and disarmament.

26. The process of restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat has been widely welcomed as a necessary improvement of the basis of its accomplishments. It is the earnest hope of many Member States, Bulgaria included, that in the course of introducing the necessary institutional changes full use will be made of the expertise and rich experience of the Secretariat's units that have so far successfully dealt with arms control and disarmament.

27. Bulgaria believes that the Secretariat should continue to serve equally effectively and efficiently the various needs that Member States may have in promoting priority measures in this important area. The expectation is that the reorganized Office for Disarmament Affairs will be adequately staffed to permit it not only to develop and operate the United Nations arms register and the disarmament database, but also to carry out efficiently its other priority tasks in the field of disarmament.

28. The completion in 1992 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, being the first multilateral disarmament agreement providing for an unprecedented verification mechanism with global coverage, represents major evidence of the significant role of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. This Conference remains the sole multilateral negotiating body on arms control and disarmament agreements as well as on other important issues. The Conference on Disarmament can and should further contribute significantly to addressing the post-cold-war issues relating to peace, global stability and security.

29. Bulgaria supports the efforts to rationalize further the operation of the Conference on Disarmament by re-evaluating its agenda, membership and methods of work, and promoting close cooperation with other disarmament bodies, taking into account the necessary interrelationship between various aspects of international security. The Conference on Disarmament could well focus its efforts on issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transparency in armaments, comprehensive nuclear-test ban, negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and so on.

30. Bulgaria considers it timely and endorses the idea of a balanced expansion of the Conference on Disarmament membership, with a view to establishing a more open forum for negotiations that can continue to tackle successfully new priorities issues in terms of its working agenda and with adequate representation.

31. Bulgaria believes that all the aims and disarmament priorities discussed in the "New dimensions" report are practical and obtainable. As already pointed out, none seems utopian, as in international politics one of the most important means of reducing violence in inter-State relations is arms control and disarmament.

Canada

[Original: English]

[17 February 1993]

1. Canada considers the Secretary-General's report to be a useful complement to an "Agenda for peace" (A/47/277-S/24111). It offers the prospect of real solutions to the problems that face the United Nations in the peace and security field. This is especially true as the United Nations moves away from the cold war rhetoric and begins to define a course of action to enable the international community to respond more effectively to the new challenge of promoting a system of global cooperative security.

2. The evolution of geo-political forces in the last four years has created new and more complex security challenges. The discipline of the cold war has dissipated without being replaced, with the result that regional conflicts have been able to flourish unchecked. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for the United Nations to adopt new procedures and new approaches to the security problems facing the world. This challenge was recognized in the "Agenda for Peace". The task in addressing arms control in the post-cold-war era is to move away from the processes, groupings and mechanisms of the cold war and adopt new agendas and procedures designed to address today's and tomorrow's problems.

3. In this context, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention brings to the forefront three immediate challenges: (a) the need to confirm and strengthen through universal adherence and enhancing verification mechanisms as appropriate, existing global instruments (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention itself); (b) to develop further and harmonize where possible export controls of sensitive technologies; and (c) to develop and apply regional arms control regimes, linking global and specific regional measures, as required (e.g. the Middle East peace process). For each of these, but particularly the latter, the direct essential linkage between security concerns and arms control measures will have to be emphasized. Confidence-building steps will be increasingly important.

4. Canada's priorities are effectively established: (a) horizontal and vertical non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and of missile systems for their delivery. This includes the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; (b) effective action to prevent the excessive build-up of conventional arms inventories. (During the 1991 debate

on the arms register at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly we made it clear that our goal was not just transparency, but consultations among States in order to encourage more self-restraint in transfers and in order to help build broader consensus on means of avoiding excessive build-ups. Canada views the register as a means and not an end in itself); (c) development and implementation of confidence-building measures - including appropriate verification mechanisms - for global and regional situations as required.

5. Despite positive developments in recent years, we recognize that the proliferation of the technology and equipment capable of making weapons of mass destruction continues to be a source of instability and, in the words of the historic Security Council summit declaration of 31 January 1992, a threat to international peace and security. We encourage all countries to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the words of the Secretary-General, the NPT must be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

6. We wholeheartedly agree with the Secretary-General's observation that transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures are an important trend to encourage and that the United Nations arms register is an important practical step. We particularly welcome his assurance that the United Nations will do all it can to make the register a success, including we assume ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to it. For our part, Canada has consistently and actively supported the concept of transparency in armaments. We intend to work actively to ensure tht as many States as possible comply fully with the arms register - providing both data and information - by the due date of 30 April 1993.

7. Canada is also encouraged to see a growing interest among nations in developing regional approaches to arms control and disarmament. Canada's view is that regional approaches to disarmament can make valuable contributions to our collective pursuit of the broader objectives of disarmament and international security. For example, at Vienna, negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, and European conventional armed forces within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have demonstrated the benefits that such a regional approach can offer to all participating States. In the Middle East as well, as part of the peace process, discussions are taking place on arms control. Other regional players are also taking a more concerted, active approach to regional security including within the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Organization of American States.

8. Turning specifically to the Secretary-General's report, Canada supports the central thesis that three key themes - integration, globalization, and revitalization - are the foundation stones of an intensified international effort to enhance the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament. In particular we support the assertion that the process of arms limitation and disarmament is the responsibility of every State. Likewise we agree with the Secretary-General that disarmament continues to be centrally relevant to international peace and security.

9. The global security environment has been changing rapidly since the end of the cold war. Opportunities and challenges abound as the international order is restructured. We agree in principle with the concept that disarmament and inspection procedures play an important part in the field of peace enforcement and arms limitation. We would add that verification of disarmament and arms limitation agreements can also facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. It is our view that the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Conference and experts groups should be dealing with the role of the United Nations in verification. Verification may provide an important linkage among many of these previously separate concepts - a new integrative dimension. At the very least, the United Nations must be active in exploring new ideas in these areas. This issue should not only continue to engage the Security Council but also the broader United Nations membership.

10. Canada was interested in the Secretary-General's reference to an increased role for the Security Council in disarmament matters and, in particular, in the enforcement of non-proliferation. Given the range of views that currently exists among Member States on this proposal, Canada views the resumed session of the First Committee as an important opportunity for further dialogue thereon.

11. In Canada's view, the Office of Disarmament Affairs should be the focal point of a revitalized United Nations role in multilateral arms control and disarmament. Therefore, we particularly welcome the commitment, given by former Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky, to strengthening the Office so that it can indeed function as such a focal point. We believe the United Nations has an important role to play in promoting informal mechanisms for security dialogue - particularly in regions or subregions where institutional frameworks for such discussions are not yet fully developed. In this manner, the Office of Disarmament Affairs can help ensure that regional processes and mechanisms serve to reinforce and complement global norms. Canada commends these ongoing activities of the Office.

12. Clearly many other Member States feel the same way, as is evidenced by the support given to the three United Nations regional offices - and to other related activities of the Office of Disarmament Affairs - at the Tenth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign. Participating Member States will recall that this year a trend of the past few years was dramatically reversed with an increase of over 50 per cent from the previous year's total. In this regard, however, we note that a greater effort must be made to address the disparity in pledges from one region to another.

13. The Secretary-General's proposal to examine the role of private international arms dealers and their connection to the burgeoning problem of international arms transfers is noted with interest. It is disturbing to observe that such transfers are being made at the cost of human, social and economic development. The proposal to establish a task force to provide Member States with advice on military conversion programmes is also to be commended. On the other hand we note that regional forums are also conducting similar studies; such duplication of effort should be avoided if possible.

14. We strongly agree with the Secretary-General that the time is ripe for a thorough reassessment by Member States of the United Nations disarmament machinery in order to ensure that it is able to meet new realities. A useful starting point, in our view, is to recall the main functions of each of the three multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies - the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, then to identify problems in the effective carrying out of these roles and finally to seek to identify practical means of responding to these problems.

A. First Committee

15. In Canada's view, the role of the First Committee - a global, deliberative body - is to identify priorities on the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda and to build support and momentum as an essential first step in the broader process of international norm building as it relates to arms control and disarmament. This process not only contributes to the identification and promotion of broad principles but increasingly - as the arms register so graphically demonstrates - focuses on concrete steps the international community can take towards the achievement of these broad goals or norms.

16. The First Committee continues to provide a useful framework for the United Nations membership to elaborate and clarify positions on a variety of arms control and disarmament issues. Rationalization of the First Committee's work is progressing, for example, combining the debate on disarmament and international security items. We should now take the logical next step of combining action on these two sets of items. Only then will we have fully integrated our consideration of means - arms control and disarmament measures - with our desired end - the maintenance of international peace and security.

17. We need to accelerate the task of rationalization, of setting concrete and practical priorities and of ensuring fewer resolutions, and more genuine dialogue. Now that East/West polarization is over, there is the possibility for greater functional cooperation on specific issues among delegations from differing groups and perspectives. An example of this in the First Committee context is the merger of the Mexican and Western core group comprehensive test-ban treaty resolutions.

18. The length of the plenary debate in First Committee could be shortened, either through the elimination of oral statements or their limitation to a strict time limit of 10 minutes maximum. Additionally, the circulation of executive summaries along with printed texts could be encouraged. Ideally, Member States should strive to distribute their text at the very outset of the time allotted for plenary debate, thereby ensuring that the time normally used for the reading of texts could be devoted to more informal consultations among delegations. With respect to consideration of individual items, including the introduction of resolutions, a better overall system of grouping items might facilitate a more genuine interchange on related issues.

B. United Nations Disarmament Commission

19. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is the second global deliberative body. Its primary role is to allow focused discussion of a limited agenda without the pressure of voting on resolutions. Its function encompasses conceptual discussion, consensus-building with respect to arms control and international security-related issues (e.g. transfer of technology), as well as the identification of global and regional measures for negotiation elsewhere. The Commission also prepares the groundwork for the Conference on Disarmament through the development of principles as well as providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the agenda of the Conference.

20. We believe that a mechanism is required to provide a greater degree of linkage between the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament in order for Commission deliberations to become more relevant and results oriented. Closer cooperation and some mechanism for linkage or dialogue is therefore required in the short term, if these two bodies are to remain relevant in the rapidly changing arms control and disarmament environment. In the longer term, when membership of the two bodies is more similar, the merging of the two may be feasible especially if cost factors can be overcome. Greater linkage between the Commission and the Conference will, however, be problematic as long as membership of the Conference remains restricted and Commission's membership universal.

21. Within the United Nations the reform process in the United Nations Disarmament Commission is most advanced. For example, we are well on the way to achieving a rolling, three-item agenda, which, on the one hand, ensures a degree of predictability while, on the other, allows us to incorporate contemporary issues in a timely manner.

22. Beyond this, the Commission is at the stage where it has too much time to engage in general debate but - without more advance preparation by delegations - too little time for in-depth dialogue on complex issues in which there exist some rather fundamental differences of view. In order for it to live up to its full potential, every effort must be made to circulate focused working papers - preferably reflecting joint efforts of a number of countries spanning differences of view - in advance of the session so delegations come prepared for in-depth dialogue.

C. Conference on Disarmament

23. The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is of course to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The Conference can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban and outer space. Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention has, however, temporarily exhausted a meaningful agenda for that body. Negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all

time remains a priority objective. There should be strong verification provisions building on the work of the Group of Seismic Experts to establish global monitoring mechanisms.

24. Conference on Disarmament procedures and membership are closely linked but subsidiary to its substantive negotiating agenda. We have recognized for some time that the current membership, and possibly the Conference itself, no longer reflects the changing international security environment. We are in favour of broadening its membership to admit those States which have formally applied.

25. We also hope that the Conference on Disarmament can energize movement on the issue of transparency in armaments. We hope that the current session will provide productive debate on this issue, as well as with respect to radiological weapons and outer space.

26. The Secretary-General suggested in his report to have the Conference on Disarmament take on the role of a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Canada has reservations about the notion of having it take on such a role. The focus of the Conference on Disarmament should not be diverted away from being the sole body in the United Nations with the authority to negotiate global arms control agreements.

Conclusion

27. The three multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies have distinct, yet complementary and interrelated functions. In Canada's view, the resumed session therefore offers a unique opportunity: (a) to reaffirm the distinctive roles of each of the three multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies and of the Office of Disarmament Affairs as the "focal point" for such activity; (b) provide additional impetus to the ongoing work of rationalization of the three bodies; and (c) provide an opportunity for focused consideration of practical ways to enhance the effective interaction of these three bodies.

28. The report on a "New dimension of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", as with the "Agenda for Peace", is a thought-provoking document. We agree with the assertion that there is a parallel between conflict resolution and disarmament; the process of conflict resolution must be supported by concrete arms control and disarmament measures.

29. Beyond this, is the need to liberate the term "arms control and disarmament" from its cold war preoccupation with numbers of weapons. As important as this is, arms control and disarmament is now seen both to embrace and constitute a part of a far broader process of confidence-building, of transparency, of accountability, of verification and, most importantly, of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on genuinely cooperative mechanisms for creating and enhancing international peace and security. The Secretary-General's personal commitment to these issues is most welcome.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]

[5 February 1993]

1. Although the report contains positive ideas such as the strengthening of preventive diplomacy and of peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, it omits to mention such current disarmament issues as the final prohibition of nuclear weapons, equitable access to the benefits of scientific and technological development and the need to balance the legal regimes existing in various international disarmament and arms limitation instruments.

2. The Government of Chile believes that this is a particularly auspicious moment to strengthen the disarmament functions of the United Nations. The Secretariat machinery must be properly reinforced and the General Assembly must be strengthened, in order to avoid tilting the balance of functions in favour of other organs of the United Nations system such as the Security Council.

3. With regard to the role of the Conference on Disarmament and its relationship with the Security Council, the Government of Chile would prefer that the Charter of the United Nations continue to be interpreted as limiting the Council's involvement to urgent situations which pose a serious threat to international peace and security. This does not alter the need for complementarity of functions between the two organs, but recognizes that their nature and purpose are different.

4. In the Conference on Disarmament, the issues of expanding its membership and setting its agenda must be addressed separately. Trying to solve the two aspects harmoniously could cause one to unnecessarily delay the other.

5. The agenda of the Conference should be reduced to the priority issues which really concern the international community. The current practice of not giving ad hoc committees a negotiating mandate must, moreover, be ended. This will obviously require unambiguous political will on the part of countries members of the Conference.

6. An early decision must be taken on the question of increasing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. In present circumstances, it seems unrealistic to implement the 1986 proposal to create four new vacancies. Instead, a political balance must be struck which meets the requirements of balanced political, geographical and military representation and does not impede the Conference's functioning.

7. Globalization of the disarmament process is clearly a desirable objective in this new era of international relations. However, experience has shown that great Power arms reduction processes are not always easy to emulate. Moreover, those processes tend to become complex when they involve developing States whose regional situations are complicated by historical, ethnic,

religious or economic rivalries. As the Secretary-General points out in paragraph 16 of his report, such countries must decide for themselves what disarmament measures suit them best.

8. The Government of Chile is conscious of its regional responsibilities in this area and has taken practical steps towards creating a climate of confidence in Latin America by signing agreements on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and by formulating comments on the Treaty of Tlatelolco which facilitate its early entry into force. In this same context, the Government of Chile will organize regional seminars in future to promote a better understanding of these and other disarmament initiatives.

9. As regards new disarmament machinery, the Government of Chile supports the creation of the Register of Conventional Arms Transfers and hopes that a universal, non-discriminatory regime that also covers weapons of mass destruction will be consolidated in the future.

10. The strengthening of peace-keeping operations, to which the Government of Chile has the honour of contributing, is another important point in the Secretary-General's report. The time has perhaps come to recognize such operations formally in the Charter of the United Nations, taking care to guarantee their multifunctional character and not just their purely military component.

11. As the Secretary-General points out in his report, conversion is a complex undertaking. Chile too is concerned about the implications of conversion for environmental protection and also the technical and financial facilities involved, which make it necessary that the developed countries share their expertise with other nations.

12. In conclusion, the Government of Chile agrees that the various legal regimes in the area of disarmament should be made universal. However, this can be done only if the international treaties in question avoid perpetuating discriminatory situations. The foregoing is without prejudice to other forms of agreement and the adoption of confidence-building measures, provided that these do not diminish the binding force of disarmament treaties.

Colombia

[Original: Spanish]

[3 February 1993]

1. We welcome this timely document, since the task we are now working on in the United Nations, as the considerable importance attached to the report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) and the wide debate to which it has given rise demonstrate, is to define a new legal and ideological basis for the actions of the international community in a world no longer divided into two opposing blocs.

2. That the international situation has changed dramatically in recent years is self-evident. These changes do not amount to a completely new beginning, however; we must continue to work on those aspects and priorities on which there is still room for improvement and refinement. The "new dimensions" must rest on the legacy of the past century, and disarmament priorities cannot be replaced by mere arms "regulation".

3. Within this framework, the delegation of Colombia wishes to make the following comments on the issues raised in the report in document A/C.1/47/7.

I. Integration

Disarmament and development

4. The document states that "disarmament, the structuring of a new system of international relations and improving economic conditions" are complementary measures. We share this view, but would add that the relationship between disarmament and development, which the report does not mention, is the cornerstone of any effort to establish a new system of international security. The difficult situation created by the tremendous economic disparities between countries and regions of the world, and the specific problems of the developing countries with regard to disarmament and the diversion of resources, deserve greater emphasis. Moreover, the new priorities of the global agenda as set forth in Agenda 21 will have to be incorporated in our deliberations on the resources released by progress in disarmament, the destruction of existing weapons stockpiles and other relevant issues analysed in the document entitled "Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment" (A/46/364).

Conflict resolution and disarmament

5. While there may clearly be a relationship between conflict resolution and disarmament, this relationship cannot be interpreted causally nor the two processes equated conceptually. Contrary to the assertion in paragraph 11 of the report, we do not believe that "our effectiveness in addressing" the various activities related to peace-keeping and peacemaking will determine the progress made "in achieving concrete disarmament measures". Efforts in the area of disarmament, including transparency, confidence-building, regional agreements, non-proliferation and verification, cannot be subordinated to geopolitical forces.

6. As a result, we must emphasize, as the report rightly does, the difference between disarmament measures resulting from "peace enforcement" processes and those resulting from disarmament negotiating processes. The former are covered by the Charter of the United Nations and, by virtue of Article 24 thereof, are the responsibility of the Security Council. In this connection, while our delegation supports the Council's efforts to resolve difficult conflicts at the global level, we would recall that the activities

and measures described in "An Agenda for Peace" are still being discussed by the competent organs.

7. Progress in disarmament through negotiations stands in clear contrast to the processes just described. Member States' national security interests are at stake here and cannot be subordinated to the recommendations or aspirations of any forum or limited group of countries. The United Nations has a duty to provide ample room for deliberations on an equal footing, but it cannot ignore the sovereignty of any nation nor assume partisan positions with respect to the delicate issues being dealt with in the disarmament sphere.

II. Globalization

8. We agree with the report's emphasis on the role that regional organizations can play in promoting confidence-building measures, transparency and disarmament agreements which respond to the particular characteristics of each region.

9. However, we believe that the concept of globalization cannot be used to lessen the primary responsibility which the major military Powers bear in the field of disarmament, not only because it was they that thought up the massive arms races that have left us with a legacy of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also because they are the main producers of conventional weapons and their greed for markets is encouraging regional arms races. Their excessive stockpiles are the main cause of the global military imbalance, and the development of new generations of weapons is creating new capacities for destruction and instability. Moreover, many of the conflicts now challenging the international community's ability to respond effectively were caused by those Powers' former struggle to establish spheres of influence: Angola, Somalia and Iraq are but three tragic examples.

10. Colombia believes that only a determined commitment to multilateral disarmament processes will make it possible to establish a new system of international security. At the same time, this "globalization" of the disarmament process will have to be reflected in the agenda of disarmament forums and in broad participation therein.

11. The recent and ongoing conflicts in many regions of the world make it essential, as we have been repeating for years and as the report points out, that negotiations be conducted not only on weapons of mass destruction but also on the limitation and non-proliferation of conventional weapons.

12. The priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, which the report surprisingly fails to mention, cover these concerns and developments. This document will have to be our blueprint until the commitments made therein are fulfilled. The time has come to put these consensus strategies into practice, and the military Powers that were involved in the cold war will have to be a part of this process.

III. Revitalization

Transparency

13. We agree with the concept of "revitalization" as defined in the report, but believe that the goal of building on past achievements in the area of disarmament will have to be reformulated on the basis of criteria which go to make up a multilateral, comprehensive, non-discriminatory approach. As the Secretary-General rightly indicates, confidence-building and transparency are only measures, not goals. Colombia has always supported the implementation of these undeniably important measures, but believes that they are no substitute for concrete progress in disarmament, despite the emerging trend towards that view in some bodies.

14. As a result, instruments such as the Arms Register, while obviously worthwhile, will have to be broadened in order to eliminate their discriminatory undertones, for if some countries perceive themselves to be at a disadvantage this clearly will not lead to global security. Military information must be readily accessible to all States. If this goal is achieved, we believe that confidence-building measures, including the Register, can be especially useful at the regional level in achieving maximum arms reduction.

Weapons of mass destruction and proliferation

15. Progress has been made in strategic and nuclear arms reduction, but now that the cold war is over, there is a risk that arms-producing countries will look for other justifications for the stockpiling, sale and continued development of new generations of weapons, to the detriment of global peace and security. Proliferation is not going to be halted simply through bilateral negotiations, especially since the break-up of the Soviet Union has created a situation where specialists in nuclear technology could be tempted to offer their know-how to the world market. Bilateral negotiations are undeniably important for disarmament, but only an equitable multilateral approach can help encourage efforts to halt arms races.

16. We are surprised to see no mention of the serious problems of vertical proliferation and continuing production of nuclear weapons. The mounting stockpiles and dizzying refinement of these weapons are against the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should therefore be supplemented by a binding legal instrument embodying negative security guarantees for non-nuclear States.

17. Because of these concerns and potential developments in the nuclear sphere, we view with concern the statement in paragraph 28 of the report that the Treaty should be extended "indefinitely and unconditionally". We believe that this not only prejudges the future work of the Conference and the substantive debate on the Treaty's extension, but also ignores the various positions which many delegations have taken repeatedly on this subject. We believe that the Conference should combine a review of the past five years of

the Treaty's application with a substantive discussion of its extension. Extension of the Treaty will have to depend on its review, otherwise a status quo would be perpetuated which offers little prospect of rectifying the flagrant international military imbalance. Indefinite extension of the Treaty must be linked implicitly to real progress in nuclear disarmament and, especially, to the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

18. We agree with the report as to the importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. However, the report fails to mention other instruments which are also essential to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties, among others, would have merited a mention in the report.

Transfers

19. We welcome the report's reference to "international arms dealers". Colombia has been saying for years that these dealers are one of the main obstacles to progress in conventional disarmament and to the establishment of regional and international security. Arms-exporting countries must cut out their private agents and intermediaries, whose activities are a factor in the absence of effective control over arms exports and thus a source of illicit arms trafficking. We support the recommendation to develop regional agreements on clearly excessive or threatening conventional military capabilities. We also emphasize the need to draw up an international code of conduct for limiting arms transfers to those strictly necessary for States' legitimate internal or external defence.

20. With regard to transfers of dual-use technologies, the report rightly states that transparent, non-discriminatory controls must be established which do not hamper the peaceful uses of such technologies. Interesting documents on this question have been presented in the Disarmament Commission and we hope that definite progress will be made on this issue at its next session.

IV. New challenges

Conversion

21. The success of conversion will depend partly on the commitment that the industrialized countries make to reducing their economic dependence on the military industry. As long as their arms exports remain at current levels, it will be difficult to persuade other countries, such as those in transition, to undertake comprehensive conversion programmes. The forces and profits of the arms market create pressures that feed proliferation.

22. We agree with the report that "adequate technical and financial facilities to make this transition in a balanced manner" must be provided. We also believe that "the safe destruction and storage of armaments resulting from disarmament agreements" is a current priority. We are concerned about the potential environmental impact of these processes and the possibility that some weapons, systems and equipment might be diverted to developing countries if elimination is not verifiable.

New machinery

Respective powers

23. Colombia has drawn attention repeatedly to the fundamental need to respect the powers of the different organs of the United Nations as established in the Charter. Under Article 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly has the power to consider "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". We view with deep concern the recommendation that there should be "greater Security Council involvement" in disarmament matters. As we said earlier, a distinction must be made between disarmament brought about by peace processes and disarmament resulting from negotiations among sovereign States. As the Secretary-General himself says, disarmament processes will have to be multilateral if they are to lead to the establishment of an effective system of international security. It would be difficult for the Security Council to determine acceptable armament levels for the entire international community. It is up to the General Assembly to analyse the implications of disarmament issues and decide on any adjustments in its multilateral machinery.

24. Since some of the world's main arms producers are members of the Security Council, we also question the feasibility of allowing the Security Council greater involvement in enforcing non-proliferation. We believe that resolution 687 (1991) is only one example of a disarmament process resulting from a peacemaking operation carried out under the Charter, and that it cannot be used to justify, or serve as a model for, permanently and universally altering the mandate of the Security Council.

Disarmament machinery

25. The report recommends a review of the United Nations "machinery" for dealing with disarmament issues. As we have stated, Colombia considers that the framework provided by the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is still valid and appropriate. As has been pointed out on other occasions, the problem is a lack of political will; it is not structural. We therefore view with concern the trend towards reducing the staff of the Secretariat, a development which will certainly have an adverse effect on our work.

26. Also surprising is the absence of any mention in the report of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. As Colombia has stated on numerous occasions, those bodies have a pre-eminent role to play in deliberations and achievements in the area of disarmament. We consider that the efforts being made in those bodies and in the Conference on Disarmament are complementary, and they should therefore be strengthened. We support efforts to streamline the debates in the First Committee. With regard to the Disarmament Commission, we hope that a balanced agenda of three items can be worked out, which will enable us to consider these items in an informed and comprehensive way with a view to submitting relevant and viable recommendations.

Conclusion

27. As clearly shown by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the large number of signatories to that convention, the historic signing of the START II agreement and the moratoria on nuclear testing declared by a number of nuclear Powers, among other developments, the post-cold-war world has created opportunities for significant progress towards complete and general disarmament. We believe that this political will, if it forms part of a multilateral approach covering both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, enable us to forge a new system of international security. The emphasis which has been placed on confidence-building measures and the active participation of regional organizations in the field of disarmament are collateral developments which will contribute decisively to the achievement of tangible progress in reducing and eliminating weapons of all kinds. In this context, the United Nations will have an important role to play and we therefore believe it is necessary to strengthen the Secretariat and the various forums which deal with disarmament issues. Colombia hopes to be able to contribute constructively to the achievement of the objective that is sought by everyone: a lasting and genuine peace.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]

[28 January 1993]

1. The report refers to the necessity of reviewing and reforming the tasks and methods used by the international community in the past in the field of disarmament. This seems logical and reasonable, in principle, in view of the fact that the end of the cold war and East-West confrontation has radically changed the international conditions affecting the conduct of the disarmament and arms control processes. Undoubtedly, these processes must be adapted to the changed conditions. There is a need, however, to guard against some countries altering the tasks and methods used in the past in the area of disarmament so that these tasks and methods reflect primarily their interests and concerns and not those of the international community as a whole.

2. The main purpose of the proposed process of reviewing and reforming the tasks and methods used by the international community in the past in the field of disarmament and arms control should be to revitalize the entire process with the aim of making it more effective and, thereby, to speed up the adoption of measures and agreements conducive to the achievement of general and complete disarmament as soon as possible under effective international control.

3. The process of disarmament and arms control must receive top priority at the multilateral level, even in the new international conditions which now exist, in view of the excessive build-up of armaments of all kinds in some

States, in particular weapons enabling them to carry out rapid and large-scale offensive operations deep inside the territory of other States. Such arms must be totally eliminated and all States must adopt an exclusively defensive military doctrine and structure of their armed forces.

4. The concept of integration which is referred to in paragraph 4 and further developed in section I of the report needs to be considered in detail and in depth. We do not disagree with the idea of establishing closer links between disarmament and arms regulation issues, on the one hand, and the problems connected with the maintenance of international peace and security, on the other, but we cannot accept the intention reflected in the paragraphs in which this subject is discussed that there should not be an independent organizational framework for such issues and that they can exist solely as part of international efforts to strengthen international peace and security, taken to mean those efforts associated with the so-called "Agenda for Peace" contained in the Secretary-General's report in document A/47/277.

5. The process of disarmament and arms control has a dynamic of its own and we should preserve the organizational independence of that process, without overlooking the appropriateness of linking this process with other elements of the system of international relations, with the improvement of economic and social conditions, and with the strengthening of international peace and security, among other things.

6. In addition, there is a need to promote the idea that the linkages and relations between the various components of this process should be even further strengthened so as to progress more quickly and more surely towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

7. It should also be noted that section I of the report places great emphasis on the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace", but not on strengthening the relationship between the various components of the disarmament and arms control process itself, which, in our view, is the most important aspect which should be promoted.

8. The concept of revitalizing the achievements in the field of disarmament and arms control should be supported, but the emphasis should be on the necessity of respecting the established priorities in this area as identified in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This does not rule out the possibility of identifying specific aspects of such priorities on which the negotiating effort might now be focused with the aim of producing new achievements that would be incorporated in disarmament and arms control agreements further reducing the risks of conflicts which, given their scope, could affect international or regional peace and security.

9. It bears emphasizing that the fact that specific established priorities already exist does not prevent the simultaneous consideration of matters which are deemed suitable and which relate to different areas within such priorities.

10. In essence, we agree with the concept of globalization mentioned in paragraph 5, but it should be made quite clear that it is essential to maintain a certain priority with regard to the themes and issues to be dealt with at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels, so as to avoid giving equal importance to all the elements or components of the process of disarmament and arms control.

11. Multilateral, regional and bilateral processes should be closely related and should complement each other. Accordingly, we agree with the objective being sought by introducing the concept of globalization. Nevertheless, we must stress the fundamental importance of the process of disarmament and arms control at the multilateral level, bearing in mind its inherent characteristics.

12. Paragraph 9 states that, "although we have taken some strides in dealing with excesses in armaments and military expenditures, the world remains a dangerous place". We share that view.

13. Consequently, in our view, in order to make the world a safer place, the following measures are necessary:

(a) All nuclear weapons must be eradicated from the face of the Earth and that process must be supervised through a system of effective verification.

(b) All chemical weapons must be eliminated and biological and radiological weapons prohibited. The elimination of chemical weapons can be achieved if all States become party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, and if there is effective verification of compliance by States parties with their commitments. That could be achieved in the case of biological weapons if effective measures are adopted with the view to instituting a system of verification ensuring that States parties comply with their commitments, and if the Convention now in force achieves wider acceptance. In the case of radiological weapons, that could be achieved through the adoption of an international agreement to prohibit the build-up of that type of weapon, provided that the agreement gained the support of the great majority of States of the international community.

(c) There is a need to devise and adopt measures that would, inter alia, reduce the arms traffic, reduce the production of weapons and their excessive stockpiling by certain States, and bring to an end all research and development on certain types of weapons.

(d) Tension and conflicts must be reduced, making it possible to cut military expenditure and divert funds to meet the vital needs of peoples in the majority of the countries of the international community, especially the developing countries.

14. Paragraph 10 refers to the improvement of economic conditions, but that should be supplemented by the improvement of social conditions.

15. Paragraph 13 states that the use of disarmament measures within the framework of peace enforcement is quite distinct from the process of disarmament through negotiation, which several States have been pursuing. Cuba agrees with that view.

16. Disarmament measures adopted as a result of peace-keeping operations are in general of a unilateral or limited nature, whether imposed externally or achieved through negotiation, and only involve the parties to the conflict.

17. Disarmament measures adopted through negotiation between different States tend to reflect the sovereign desire of those States to eliminate or limit one type of weapon or a number of different weapons systems, especially those which are considered to pose a danger to regional or international peace and security. That negotiating process must in no way be imposed by any United Nations body, including the Security Council.

18. Paragraph 15 mentions an idea which Cuba does not share: in its view, the major military Powers must continue to shoulder the main responsibility for adopting measures and initiatives for disarmament and arms control, and that responsibility has not ceased to be valid, even under present international conditions - quite the contrary.

19. On the other hand, the fact that those countries must bear the main responsibility for disarmament and arms control does not imply that they should be the only States to respect the objectives and purposes associated with general and complete disarmament; they are, however, the ones which should take appropriate initiatives in this field.

20. Completion of the building of a system of international security is a task of vital importance for all countries, and especially for the small or militarily weak States.

21. However, that system must not be based on the guarantee that a body such as the Security Council in its present form will take action in the event that cracks should appear in the system, since, in addition to being unrepresentative of the international community, it is anti-democratic, with a very small group of countries possessing the power to block any action by that body which might go against their vital interests, ignoring the wishes of the majority of States members of the international community.

22. Should that system of international security be violated by one of the countries which holds veto power, the Council would be unable to take any action that would reflect the interests of the country affected and condemn the aggressor.

23. Paragraph 17 refers to the relentless accumulation of armaments and its effect, but we feel that mention should also be made of the excessive stockpiles of weapons under the control of a small group of States.

24. Nuclear disarmament should continue to be of the utmost priority, even in the current international conditions.

25. States possessing the largest nuclear-weapon arsenals must continue to take measures to reduce those arsenals even more, and the necessary conditions must be created for involving all the remaining nuclear States in that process.

26. Negotiations for nuclear disarmament must be carried on at all levels, both bilateral and multilateral, and should complement each other. Every possibility must be utilized to conclude those negotiations, provided they lead to the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons.

27. In the process of nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban should have, at the multilateral level, utmost priority. During this process, the nuclear Powers should adopt indefinite moratoriums on such testing.

28. Any paragraph that deals with the concept of non-proliferation should refer primarily to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which should be totally eliminated as a matter of priority.

29. Nevertheless, that term should also be applied to certain types of conventional weapons, especially those which would permit major offensive operations in the territories of other States, rapid deployment deep within the territory of an adversary, and other destabilizing actions.

30. Paragraph 27 states that there can be no justification for any State, in present circumstances, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction. We consider that it should also be stated that there is no justification whatsoever for possessing such weapons.

31. Paragraph 20 does not mention the need to eliminate the contentious aspects of the current non-proliferation regime so as to make it acceptable to those countries not covered by that regime.

32. In particular, it should be emphasized that the non-proliferation regime should guarantee the destruction of all nuclear weapons under the control of a small group of countries within a specific time-frame, which should be as short as possible, if that regime is to become universal.

33. In the view of Cuba, the best means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime is to adopt the above-mentioned measures. Once adopted and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons appropriately amended, conditions would be created for prolonging that instrument indefinitely and expanding the number of States parties. Until then, it should be extended for specific periods, followed by an assessment of compliance with its provisions by States parties, especially the nuclear Powers.

34. The idea expressed at the end of paragraph 20, concerning the necessity of not dividing the world into the categories of "haves" and "have-nots" with respect to whether they possess certain types of weapons, should be applied to nuclear weapons, which would remove the fundamental obstacle to making the regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons universal.

35. The subject of transparency in international arms transfers is of particular importance for ascertaining the true intentions of States, but if we analyse this phenomenon without addressing the problem of the production and stockpiling of weapons and of military research and development, among other questions, the knowledge of those intentions would not extend to the principal weapons producers, which are, furthermore, those which possess a military might significantly exceeding their own defence needs.

36. Consequently, it is essential not only to put into operation the Register of Conventional Arms, but also to guarantee its appropriate expansion in the immediate future, as provided for in the relevant United Nations resolution.

37. The phrase "provocative arms transfers" in paragraph 32 should be replaced in future by another that better reflects what it is intended to mean.

38. It would be more appropriate to speak of "destabilizing" or "offensive aims", "occupation of the territories of other States", "for the purposes of conducting operations deep within the territory of an adversary" or any combination of those or other equivalent phrases, provided they are clearer and more precise.

39. Moreover, the concept of "conventional military capabilities" should be defined not only with respect to bilateral agreements; we consider it possible and appropriate to define it at the multilateral level.

40. The idea described in paragraph 44 of greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters is, we feel, inappropriate: under the Charter, the powers of the Council in that field are well defined and there is no reason to change them, and certainly not to expand them.

41. The idea expressed in paragraph 45, of transforming the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements, is not shared by Cuba.

42. The Conference on Disarmament should continue to be the sole forum for disarmament negotiations in the United Nations. That should be its primary task, even after adoption of the restructuring measures considered most appropriate, aimed at enhancing its effectiveness and influence in the field of disarmament and arms control.

43. The process of revitalization referred to in section III should respond to the desires and interests of the international community, not only to its most powerful members.

44. That process must not overlook what has been won so arduously in the field of disarmament and arms control, especially in respect of the machinery that is currently functioning, without ruling out any modifications that would render that process more effective.

45. The issues included in section III, while important, do not properly reflect all interests in this field and should only be addressed in the future; it should also be borne in mind that these issues are not the only ones.

Denmark*

[Original: English]

[29 January 1993]

A. General

1. The European Community and its member States thank the Secretary-General for his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7 of 23 October 1992).

2. As stated in their intervention in the First Committee on 11 November 1992 (see A/C.1/47/PV.29, pp. 6-12) the European Community and its member States share the Secretary-General's view of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world and the significant progress that has been achieved in a number of important areas of disarmament. It is also true, though, that while the world is safer from a global confrontation, particularly thanks to the ending of the cold war, new uncertainties and challenges have appeared in the form of growing militant nationalism and in the armed conflicts raging in a depressing number of parts of the globe. The present international situation brings an increased danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons. In view of these developments, the European Community and its member States consider the report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" particularly relevant and timely, as it initiates an urgently needed discussion on the future role of arms control and disarmament and how it can be implemented, with the assistance of the United Nations.

3. With the end of the cold war and in the new international environment the global processes of disarmament and arms control are no longer taking place in a context of ideological confrontation. Real disarmament and arms control are progressing on an unprecedented scale, and there is an increased willingness of the international community to engage in true dialogue and negotiations. While the multilateral disarmament discussion focused for a long period of time mostly on the nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers, it is evident that in the future genuine disarmament, while maintaining the ultimate aim of general and complete disarmament, including the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, will also concentrate on the reduction of conventional weapons to the minimum level compatible with the legitimate security needs of

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* On behalf of the European Community and its member States.

States, and that it concerns all States. Disarmament is becoming increasingly connected with non-proliferation, restraint in transfers of arms and related technology, as well as with confidence-building and transparency.

4. A multilateral approach to disarmament has become more important. A useful corollary are the regional agreements and arrangements. Their impact is not limited to the region in question, but goes beyond the region and influences global peace and security. Global disarmament cannot be achieved in a single step, but an increasing number of regional and subregional agreements can support the development of a global disarmament network, the stability of which will be enhanced by the scope and functioning of those agreements.

5. The European Community and its member States fully support the view of the Secretary-General expressed in his report that arms control and disarmament constitute an integral part of efforts to strengthen international peace and security.

6. European achievements in arms control and disarmament had and still have positive effects on arms control and disarmament activities in other regions. This can be seen, inter alia, from the widespread application of confidence-building measures as a means of reducing tensions and of improving the climate of cooperation, measures which first were developed in the region of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

7. The States participating in the CSCE process have established a new negotiating process combining, under the roof of the new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, the elaboration of new measures of disarmament and arms control, a permanent dialogue on security, and efforts to prevent conflict. In this framework, and in line with their achievements in the field of transparency and confidence-building measures, CSCE States intend to give full support to the implementation of the United Nations register of conventional arms. The European Community and its member States hope that these new instruments will contribute to the settlement of the tragic conflicts resulting from the break-up of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. And they believe that this search of CSCE for a new, cooperative and common approach to security together with the Secretary-General's concept can be of mutually reinforcing value.

8. The European Community and its member States always understood their participation in various arms control and disarmament forums belonging to the United Nations system as part of their active support to the United Nations and to the enhancement of the role and effectiveness of the Organization in strengthening international security and peace. The most recent examples of world-wide applicable arms control and disarmament agreements as well as confidence-building measures prove the particular commitment of European States to that cause: for example, their active participation in the preparation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, finalized by the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, the register of

conventional arms during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and the Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information on Military Matters adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1992.

9. In his statement made on behalf of the members of the Security Council at the conclusion of the meeting of the Council held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, the President of the Security Council underlined the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning these matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability. The European Community and its member States support this approach.

10. Unilateral measures to prevent proliferation are not sufficient, but by agreeing globally upon international verification mechanisms, confidence in multilateral disarmament agreements can be enhanced and their universality increased, thereby strengthening the security of all States.

11. The changed international environment has created new possibilities and new challenges for arms control and disarmament as a contribution to international peace and security. To meet these challenges intensified activities are required on the bilateral, subregional, regional and global level. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, the question should be addressed as to how the present United Nations-related disarmament institutions should be moulded to fit the needs of the present and the future.

B. Machinery

12. The multilateral approach to security and disarmament implies that the international community makes the fullest use of the instruments at its disposal. The United Nations has a global role to play, and the primary responsibility of the Organization is the creation of conditions allowing for a rapprochement at the political level, without which there will be no true disarmament. Collective security is closely linked to the strengthening of the authority of the United Nations, and the Organization should therefore undertake appropriate tasks in the field of arms control and disarmament, for example:

(a) To encourage and facilitate discussions of ways and means of achieving consensus in the international community with regard to disarmament and non-proliferation;

(b) To support the development of general guidelines and basic principles in the field of arms control and disarmament;

(c) To support the implementation of existing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and the negotiation of new international instruments in this field;

(d) To monitor compliance with disarmament treaties as well as consider sanctions in cases of violation thereof.

13. The European Community and its member States agree with the Secretary-General that there is reason for a reassessment of the existing arms control and disarmament machinery of the United Nations with the aim of modifying it where and whenever such a modification is needed to cope with the new realities and priorities of changing times, and to address arms control and disarmament problems in a prompt, efficient and flexible way.

14. The principle of efficiency includes the necessity to rationalize whenever appropriate, especially to avoid duplication between and within various forums.

15. These requirements have a bearing on the structure of the future machinery and the relationship between its individual components, its functions, methods of work and working agendas.

Security Council

16. The European Community and its member States fully agree that the Security Council has an important role to play in the field of arms control and disarmament, and they welcome the commitment by the members of the Council to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas, as stated by the Council at its meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992. The possibility of having recourse to the Security Council is already foreseen in principal disarmament agreements, for example, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (art. VI) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (art. XII-4). In order to fulfil its role as an effective deterrent, this means of recourse might also draw relevant lessons from the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), including the possibility of applying international sanctions, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

17. The Security Council could also encourage the conclusion of regional disarmament agreements (e.g. the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East).

18. We agree with the Secretary-General that, in conformity with the Charter, the Military Staff Committee has a role to play in assisting the Security Council in carrying out its responsibilities.

First Committee of the General Assembly

19. The First Committee offers a unique opportunity for all Member States to express their views on all issues related to arms control and disarmament. The importance of the exchange of views in the First Committee and of the resulting resolutions has grown. The improvement of the international situation has resulted in a climate of less confrontation and in the search for greater consensus in the First Committee, reflected in the growing number

of resolutions passed by consensus and an encouraging trend to seek common ground, as well as in the tentative merger of the general debates on disarmament and international security at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

20. Although the growing consensus on resolutions is encouraging and desirable, it is not as essential that consensus be achieved on all matters debated in the First Committee as it is in the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. The First Committee enables Member States to express views, differing in some cases, on a wide range of issues, but it does not itself aim to come up with guidelines or principles.

21. Further efforts to revitalize and rationalize the work of the First Committee are needed. In the view of the European Community and its member States such revitalization and rationalization could be attained by:

(a) Reducing further the number of and rationalizing agenda items and draft resolutions through the merging of similar items and resolutions and the bi- or tri-annualization of subjects that do not need to be re-examined each year, as well as by focusing on issues for possible resolutions that are widely regarded as priorities, and concentrating United Nations studies on each issues;

(b) Stressing that international security embraces, inter alia, disarmament and arms control as integral parts, and by introducing in the First Committee one general debate and one voting session for all issues dealt with by this Committee;

(c) Reducing the length of the general debate considerably and concentrating the debate on selected items, which should be organized in meaningful clusters;

(d) Placing more emphasis on issues connected with international developments and on action-oriented decisions;

(e) Reviewing yearly the time and resources allotted to the work of the First Committee;

(f) Convening, when need arises, special meetings of the First Committee, in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter of the United Nations.

United Nations Disarmament Commission

22. The Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly is open to all Member States of the United Nations and thus offers a possibility for all Members to participate in deliberations on disarmament guidelines or principles. The European Community and its member States would hope to see fuller and more active participation by Member States in this body.

23. The Disarmament Commission was reformed recently. The adoption of the Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information on Military Matters in 1992 confirms the appropriateness of this reform. However, as no reform is carried out in one step, additional steps may prove necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the Commission. The European Community and its member States are of the opinion that the international community should allow itself the flexibility needed in this regard, and in this connection can endorse the move suggested to a three-item phased agenda for the future.

24. The work of the Disarmament Commission should aim at reaching consensus on concrete guidelines or principles likely to be applied universally in view of enhancing disarmament and international security, especially in fields of ever-growing interest and importance, for example, those related to regional disarmament, international arms transfers, nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, destruction of weapons, conversion and science and technology.

25. With a view to rationalization, closer links might be established between work to be carried out by the Disarmament Commission, expert groups set up by the Secretary-General, and the Conference on Disarmament, respectively, in order to avoid duplication. The guidelines or principles agreed by the Disarmament Commission might in some cases prepare the ground for the negotiations on agreements of the Conference on Disarmament (e.g. Objective Information on Military Matters and Transparency in Armaments).

Conference on Disarmament

26. The Conference on Disarmament, the only permanent multilateral body for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements, has proven its capacity by its recent completion of a draft convention on chemical weapons, which has received world-wide support. The European Community and its member States are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament continues to be the appropriate global forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament issues, the more so as its possibilities of fulfilling its tasks have been considerably enhanced by the new international climate.

27. The Conference on Disarmament is engaged in a process of re-examination of its functioning and is reviewing its membership and agenda to ensure that they reflect current realities and meet future requirements. The Community and its member States support this process and look forward to its successful completion.

28. There is widespread support for a significant expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Its composition should be representative of the new realities of the international community. Any such expansion should be at the same time realistic and able to satisfy the legitimate concerns of those who are interested in participating and are presently excluded from full membership.

29. The European Community and its member States find that the rule of consensus, essential for a negotiating body, must be maintained.

30. The Conference on Disarmament should, if necessary after preliminary evaluation by the Disarmament Commission, focus on those disarmament issues which the international community agrees are ripe for negotiations or intensive consideration. Its agenda should reflect current realities and current concerns of the international community. To achieve this, the Conference on Disarmament could, inter alia, have exchanges of views with the Secretary-General. More interaction with the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee would also be useful. The subjects dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament should have a global impact, even when being about specifics, for example, regional issues.

Office of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat

31. The Office of Disarmament Affairs worked efficiently in the field of arms control and disarmament in the past. In the light of the globalization of arms control and disarmament, the working load of the Office is likely to increase, especially as global instruments for arms control and international confidence-building measures, for example, the register of conventional arms, require intensive work by the Office in order to make these instruments effective. The same applies to information exchanged under confidence-building measures in the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The European Community and its member States trust that the Secretary-General will provide adequate resources to enable the Office to fulfil the important tasks assigned to it by the Member States.

Ecuador

[Original: Spanish]

[31 January 1993]

1. The current international situation in disarmament and arms control demonstrates the continuing value of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The end of the cold war has not removed the threat to humanity posed by the existence of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. At the same time, policies favouring non-proliferation must not be used to bar the access of developing countries to science and technology. The concepts and guidelines of that Document should therefore, in the opinion of the Government of Ecuador, be a basic source of reference for the future work of the United Nations in the area of disarmament.

2. The report rightly mentions the positive changes that have occurred in recent months on the international scene. However, a review of the military spending figures recorded by the United Nations and other international organizations shows that the global political changes brought about by the end of the cold war unfortunately have not been reflected in cuts in such spending in the great majority of countries. On the contrary, the outbreak of new conflicts and the rekindling of others have contributed to an increase in conventional arms purchases in several regions. This, added to the huge sums

which the industrialized countries traditionally allocate to the military sector, means that military spending is absorbing resources that the international community urgently requires to meet basic human needs. This issue, addressed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 33 of his report, must be analysed carefully by Member States, bearing in mind that the policy of some industrialized countries in this area has an adverse effect on international financial and trade flows, causing serious damage to developing countries in particular.

3. Now more than ever, the international situation reveals the close relationship between security and disarmament. A number of conflicts also demonstrate the broad spectrum of economic, political, social and cultural elements that threaten international security. It is the task of all United Nations organs to identify operational mechanisms for international cooperation which pay due attention to those elements which may affect international peace and security. The deliberations and decisions of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development will doubtless be of great assistance in these tasks. It would also be of great assistance to Member States if the Secretariat, for its part, were to contribute proposals for achieving the objective set forth in the final sentence of paragraph 4 of the report.

4. The adoption of disarmament measures can contribute significantly to creating a climate favourable to international peace and security. At the same time, disarmament can come about as a result of peace and security. This relationship between disarmament on the one hand and peace and security on the other demands that the international community take further action in both areas and that it avoid making disarmament measures conditional on the existence of an environment of peace or, conversely, the strengthening of peace and security conditional on prior agreements on disarmament.

5. The important disarmament agreements reached between the United States and Russia respond to a bilateral dynamic which, like the nuclear policy of the nuclear Powers, has in practice excluded the United Nations from the decision-making process. The new prospects opened up by the end of the cold war must be expanded. The Government of Ecuador shares the view of the Secretary-General that multilateral disarmament agreements must be broadened. A growing role for the United Nations in disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, will enhance its credibility and respond to the interests of the international community as a whole. There is no justification for urging the Organization to act immediately and effectively on non-proliferation issues, while limiting it to the role of onlooker in the negotiations on reduction of arsenals.

6. The Government of Ecuador agrees with the Secretary-General that disarmament negotiations must be revitalized, the ultimate goal being the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We must build on the impetus provided by the recent adoption of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. The first step in this direction would be to negotiate, as a top priority, a short-term ban on nuclear testing. The negotiation of the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will have to take these goals into account.

7. In order to set in motion the "revitalization" of the United Nations role in disarmament suggested by the Secretary-General, the scope of the concept of a "new system of international security" mentioned in paragraph 19 of the document under discussion must be clarified.

8. As regards conventional disarmament and arms control, Ecuador believes that the successful agreements on disarmament and demobilization brokered by the United Nations in a number of civil wars made a major contribution to ending those wars. These agreements were reached after protracted negotiations between the parties and were adopted within a framework of security agreements which include political, economic and social consultation measures. Sets of commitments were fulfilled more or less simultaneously and in chronological sequence. This demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of such factors for establishing a climate of peace and bringing about disarmament. This type of localized disarmament process, to which the United Nations has usually contributed a peace-keeping force, must not be confused with the multilateral disarmament negotiations promoted systematically by the General Assembly and aimed at the creation of a peaceful and secure international environment.

9. Ecuador appreciates the positive role played by regional disarmament processes and agrees with the report that such processes should be tailored to the specific characteristics of each region. The competent regional organizations can provide positive support for such processes.

10. It is disturbing that there have been no recent bilateral or regional agreements on conventional disarmament, especially between developing countries. This may be attributable, among other things, to the limited ability of the United Nations and regional organizations to take action to encourage and promote disarmament and arms control processes. The Ecuadorian Government believes that the United Nations should renew its efforts to promote and encourage regional security arrangements involving States in a region and any others who might be able to contribute to the implementation and effectiveness of any agreements reached. For this to happen, the various conflicts whose persistence is feeding the trend towards increased military spending will have to be settled. Increased use must be made of the different mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes. The work of the United Nations will obviously be ineffective if the States directly involved in the different conflicts are not prepared to participate in such mechanisms.

11. Ecuador supports the proposal in the report that the United Nations should, where it can, support the process of industrial conversion begun by States with excessively large military industries. Nevertheless, it believes that the cost of this process will have to be borne by States themselves and by those who at one time or another promoted the arms race. This is part of the cost of the obligation to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security, just as the fight against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs imposes on countries an obligation to curb the massive influxes of foreign currency that such traffic yields.

12. While it supports renewed United Nations involvement in disarmament, Ecuador believes that the General Assembly should respond cautiously to proposals to give the United Nations an undefined role in the verification and monitoring of compliance with disarmament agreements. Such agreements generally have their own verification and monitoring systems and, in any case, where such systems do not exist, the principles of international law should apply. The proposal that a political organ such as the Security Council should be given the authority to monitor compliance with legal instruments deserves special attention. Any innovation in this field should, in Ecuador's view, be based on the Charter of the United Nations and have the effect of strengthening the international legal order.

13. The proposal in paragraph 44 of the report, for greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters in general, should be studied carefully. Ecuador supports disarmament and arms control activities carried out as part of peace-keeping operations decided on by the Council; as noted above, these have yielded positive results on a number of occasions. As for the comprehensive approach to disarmament questions in general, it seems appropriate that the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, as universal forums in which the views of all States are expressed and decisions are taken which reflect the position of the international community, should remain the competent organs in this field and that any decision weakening them should be avoided. The resumed session of the First Committee, to be held in March, will be an appropriate occasion to analyse possible courses of action that might help increase the effectiveness of both organs.

14. The Government of Ecuador attaches the utmost importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It believes that the Conference should expand its membership so that the majority of the international community are not excluded from deliberations of vital importance to everyone. It also welcomes the successful negotiation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. For these reasons, it agrees with the suggestion by the Secretary-General in paragraph 45 of his report that the efforts of the Conference might be focused "on well-defined and urgent issues". Negotiation of a nuclear-test ban could be the first such issue. Ecuador disagrees, however, with the suggestion that the Conference could be a "review and supervisory body" for disarmament agreements and regulations: not only is that the responsibility of the States parties to each agreement but, above all, the Conference must be preserved and strengthened as the sole negotiating forum for multilateral disarmament agreements.

15. The document under discussion makes no mention of the General Assembly (First Committee), the Disarmament Commission or the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat. Ecuador will give its views on the activities of those organs at the resumed session. It will confine itself here to voicing its Government's interest in seeing that the above-mentioned office is given the human and financial resources it needs to perform its functions fully.

India

[Original: English]

[29 January 1993]

1. As a country that has always been in the forefront in the cause of disarmament, India has naturally given serious thought and consideration to the report of the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". We are in full accord with the view expressed by the Secretary-General that the international community must "aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" and that "the full array of hazards posed to humanity by these weapons cannot be adequately dealt with until we have crossed the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age". It is our submission that this key objective must never be lost sight of as it is central to the theme of disarmament. We should not forget that, commendable as START II has been, even after the cuts envisaged under it have been undertaken, the nuclear-weapon States will still have awesome arsenals capable of destroying the world several times over and dividing the globe into "haves" and "have-nots". We must, therefore, seek to build on and beyond START II. It is our hope that START II would pave the way for commencement of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament involving not only the United States of America and the Russian Federation but all other nuclear-weapon States as well. This move must be inspired by the vision of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons for this is a sine qua non for the long-term establishment of international peace and security based on an equitable, stable, just and cooperative world order. In today's world, there is a compelling need for nuclear-weapon States to re-examine doctrines of nuclear deterrence that have been propounded by them in the past to justify maintenance and expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals.

2. While we recognize that the regional approach can supplement and help in global efforts in disarmament, it may be noted that the definition of a region must encompass the full range of security concerns of the countries involved as also the practicability of the specific measures of disarmament suggested in this context. Since nations perceive their security indivisibly, compartmentalizing security through artificially designated regions cannot work. Each region has to be clearly defined with the full consensus of the participating States. Agreements have to be arrived at freely among the States concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the region. Essential prerequisites for any such arrangement are scrupulous adherence to the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-incitement to terrorism, secessionism or subversion and appropriate confidence-building measures. Confidence in turn must be enhanced on all fronts and in tandem, if security has to be enhanced. Continuance of hostile acts and inflammatory statements diminish the value of political confidence-building measures.

3. In the nuclear field, the real issue today is not the NPT or its extension as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. The real issue is how to put an end to proliferation and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, there is need for an international dialogue to review the NPT to plug existing loopholes and to make it an instrument for achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Extending the NPT, which is discriminatory and imperfect to begin with and which has proved demonstrably ineffective in preventing proliferation either of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-weapon States, is not the way to achieve non-proliferation. While India shares the concerns with regard to proliferation, we do not believe that partial and unjust measures or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve the desired result. Just as chemical and biological weapons are matters of global concern to be dealt with globally, nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat cannot be addressed without a global approach. A new international understanding and consensus on what constitutes non-proliferation is urgently required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation, which is universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory, is seriously attempted. If the international community is capable of achieving a convention to ban chemical weapons, there is no reason to believe that, given the political will, it will not achieve a similar convention to ban nuclear weapons. In this respect the Chemical Weapons Convention reflects the model of a future global disarmament agreement in the nuclear field in both its multilateral negotiating format as well as its universal and non-discriminatory approach.

4. While the Conference on Disarmament has finally been able to complete negotiations on a global, non-discriminatory Chemical Weapons Convention, the recommendations regarding priorities in the field of disarmament endorsed by the international community at the first special session on disarmament had never been translated into universally accepted norms, principles and processes to deal with the dangers and to eliminate the threats comprehensively. The adoption of an "arms control" approach, as distinct and different from a "disarmament" framework, has failed to arrest proliferation and is unlikely to provide a viable paradigm for the future. The Secretary-General has expressed the hope that "over the longer term, we may achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies". He has also expressed the view that "to be fully effective, such controls must be balanced and fair: they must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology; and they should not divide the world into the invidious categories of 'haves' and 'have-nots'" (para. 29). While we fully endorse this view, we feel that this is a goal that should be achieved in the shortest time-frame possible. Closed door "clubs", "groups" and regimes created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be achieved by proposals aimed only at arms reduction, though they are welcome. Nor can initiatives that in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few States over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and export markets, for conventional weapons contribute to proliferation.

5. The views of the Secretary-General on arms transfer are noteworthy. The arms build-up, spiralled by the increased military expenditure of the big military spenders and exporters of armaments affects developing countries

doubly - in the first place, the proliferating expenditure on armaments reduces the resources available for economic development and growth, and, secondly, it fuels further competitive expenditure on account of perceived defence requirements for the security needs of the developing countries. India has all along advocated that steps should be taken to curb this tendency and trend. Unfortunately, without self-restraint on the part of the big industrialized arms suppliers and curtailment of financial assistance for purchase of weapons, this may just be a pipedream. We are impressed that everybody wants transparency in arms transfers but we are concerned that transparency is becoming an end in itself. In our view, transparency would serve no purpose if it does not achieve the objective of reduction in massive arms transfer. Transparency must be reflected in defence expenditure in per capita terms and as a proportion of GDP. It would necessarily have to be ensured that arms freed as a result of disarmament measures in one region are not diverted to other countries or organizations. An important dimension of transparency in armaments is the illicit arms trade, which is most dangerous because of its destablizing and destructive effects through the fuelling of phenomenon like State-sponsored terrorism directed against other countries, subversion and drug trafficking.

6. We agree with the views of the Secretary-General on the practical importance of United Nations register of conventional arms. This is a global confidence-building measure. To succeed, it must be non-discriminatory and attract universal adherence with a high degree of simultaneity.

7. The present disarmament machinery, we feel, is adequate to deal with the tasks at hand. The difficulty in making progress on some of the priority areas of disarmament, notably nuclear disarmament, has little to do with the present machinery. The three multilateral disarmament bodies, namely, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, have distinct yet complementary interrelated functions. The central issue is how best to rationalize the work of these three bodies to ensure that each singly and the three in combination contribute as effectively as possible to the promotion of global cooperative security. In this context, we could do no better than go by the 1990 consensus report of the Disarmament Commission on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament, as set out in the report, has a unique character and importance as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and it is important that it continues to discharge its substantive responsibility. In this context, we do not think that it would be appropriate for the Conference to take on the role of the "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements", as suggested in the Secretary-General's report (para. 45). This would divert its attention from its prime tasks as a negotiating body. In a similar vein, before considering the idea of greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, we should ensure that the decisions emanating from it reflect a consensus of the United Nations membership. It is for this reason that priority must be given to democratization of the Security Council and other United Nations organs. The Security Council must enjoy the confidence of the entire United Nations membership for only then will its actions carry credibility.

Japan

[Original: English]

[29 January 1993]

1. We live in the last decade of the twentieth century. Just as the previous decade was coming to an end, the cold war system collapsed and tensions between the East and the West dissipated. On entering this decade, however, we witnessed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, which led to the Gulf War in January 1991. That year also saw the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities that have yet to be quelled. The intensifying disorder in the former Soviet Union and the civil war in Somalia are two further examples of the regional conflicts that mark this as a decade fraught with instability.

2. Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which demonstrates the positive attitude of his office regarding issues of arms control and disarmament in the context of the world situation as described above. The report emphasizes that: (a) disarmament is an integral part of the efforts of the international community to strengthen world peace and security; (b) arms control and disarmament is an issue not only for the major military Powers but for all countries throughout the world; and (c) further progress should be sought by building on the achievements so far made in the field of arms reduction. Efforts should focus on (a) indivisible integrity, (b) globalization, and (c) revitalization of past achievements. Japan basically supports these directions.

3. In particular, Japan supports the view that arms control and disarmament, in which concrete achievements have so far been accomplished bilaterally, should be promoted on a wider - indeed, global - scale, and also that disarmament efforts in the field of conventional weapons should be redoubled on a regional basis. Japan's attention is drawn to the fact that emphasis is placed on the need for an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT and for ensuring its general acceptance.

4. At present there is momentum in certain areas, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General. On the other hand, however, Japan discerns, and is concerned by, the political trend to reverse the direction of the pendulum in those countries which have so far played a leading role in disarmament and also in countries in various parts of the globe. We must not let the time pass unproductively or the pendulum could in fact swing in the opposite direction.

5. Japan appreciates the intention expressed in the report of the Secretary-General to render the register of conventional weapons as effective and meaningful an aspect of United Nations activities as possible. It will follow closely the progress made regarding the proposal to establish an interdepartmental task force within the Secretariat to give advice to those who seek it on the political, economic and technical aspects of various issues that arise in the course of transforming military industries to civil industries.

6. As far as the register is concerned, however, while the report requests Member States to ensure the availability of adequate resources, Japan considers that the personnel and budget required to initiate the system can be adequately secured from existing resources, and that the Secretariat should be fully responsible for the maintenance and operation of the register.

7. Japan also supports the idea that the Security Council should be more involved in disarmament and enforcement of non-proliferation. The presentation of more detailed views on this matter would be most welcome.

8. The Conference on Disarmament is independent of the United Nations and has fulfilled a unique function as the sole forum for multilateral negotiation on disarmament. Although it may conduct deliberations at the request of the First Committee of the General Assembly, even in such a circumstance the Conference on Disarmament adopts its own agenda in accordance with its own procedural rules. The Conference thus acts as an independent organization. The role of reviewing and/or monitoring multilateral disarmament treaties, however, should be played primarily by States parties to the treaties concerned rather than by the Conference on Disarmament.

9. The United Nations Disarmament Commission functions as a deliberative organization supplementary to the General Assembly under a specific agenda.

10. The First Committee of the General Assembly discusses and adopts more than 40 resolutions annually.

11. Relations between the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament are generally on an ad hoc basis.

12. As seen above, despite the fact that all the organizations have the common objectives of fostering international peace and security and arms control and disarmament, and are interrelated, each has its unique function to perform. But to the degree that the level of organic relationship among them has been low, we have failed to make the most effective use of available resources.

13. Japan considers there is a need to study the further strengthening of the organic relationship among the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the First Committee of the General Assembly and to establish a definite and positive demarcation of roles among them, not only in respect of wide-ranging objectives but also of specific individual issues. In so doing, the function of each organization could be augmented. For example, when consensus adoption of a resolution on an important topic is sought, it might be advisable that the topic be discussed beforehand in the Conference on Disarmament. In order for this procedure to be followed, the number of new topics of importance to be raised should be limited to several items.

14. There is a pressing need to strengthen the function of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the Secretariat. The staff in the Office was decreased by one third compared to the size of the staff in the spring of last year.

One official at the P-4 level will be appointed to be in charge of the register, and eventually the appointment of a D-1 level official will become necessary in view of the importance of the system. The appointment of general officials is also necessary.

15. In addition, taking into account future trends in arms control and disarmament, Japan strongly opposes the further weakening of the function of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Kazakhstan

[Original: Russian]

[January 1993]

1. Kazakhstan supports the Secretary-General's view that, in the light of the new post-cold-war realities, the machinery used by the international community to address problems of arms regulation and disarmament should be reassessed. The view that disarmament should no longer be considered apart from other aspects of international security is entirely correct. Recent experience has clearly shown that a breakthrough in the field of arms regulation at both the regional and global levels is impossible unless solutions to political and economic issues are found. We note that the Secretary-General's approach to the need to strengthen the Organization's peacemaking role is in accord with President Nursultan Nazarbaev's proposal on the establishment of a fund for United Nations peacemaking efforts on the basis of the "one plus one" formula.

2. The bloody conflicts in various regions of the world, including the former USSR, clearly demonstrate that the United Nations should have at its disposal an effective mechanism to enforce peace whenever the need arises.

3. As is known, Kazakhstan put forward an initiative on the development of a regional approach to confidence-building and reducing the threat to peace in Asia. In his statement to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, President Nursultan Nazarbaev proposed a specific programme that includes, as is known, a stage-by-stage approach to the convening of a conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia.

4. Kazakhstan hopes that this initiative will be actively supported by the United Nations and States of the Asian region.

5. We believe that new States should be more actively involved in disarmament negotiations, including the Conference on Disarmament. If the Conference is to continue to be a permanent body for monitoring the observance of existing multilateral agreements in the field of arms regulation and disarmament, it should open its membership to all countries that wish to participate in its work; otherwise, the universality of that body is open to

question. The Conference considers problems of global interest relating to a number of States whose peacemaking potential should not be ignored. We request that these views be brought to the attention of the First Committee.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]

[3 February 1993]

1. With the end of the cold war, the current era in international relations has been characterized by an atmosphere of détente.

2. In consequence, the General Assembly has embarked on a collective quest for disarmament after decades of bipolar confrontation which prevented progress in specific areas. In this quest, we must identify problems and the most appropriate multilateral framework in which to solve them.

3. Since its founding, the United Nations has sought to bring about disarmament, beginning with nuclear disarmament: witness the first resolution adopted by the world body, which was devoted to the question of nuclear disarmament.

4. In the 1950s, the two principal goals of the work of the United Nations in this area were defined: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

5. Over time, it proved necessary to strengthen the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, and, at its 1978 special session on disarmament, the General Assembly reached unanimous agreement on the content of the Final Document, which embraces the entire spectrum of issues relating to disarmament, including what is known as the disarmament machinery: the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly. Since then, these three organs have attempted to adapt their work to prevailing realities. Equally, the United Nations Secretariat has been strengthened in this area to meet current needs. Some years ago, the Disarmament Commission began a process of reform and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is currently reviewing its role as the sole multilateral forum for negotiation in the light of the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the current world situation.

6. It is clear that, with the end of the cold war, the United Nations is attempting to adapt to new international realities. It is in this context that the Secretary-General submitted the report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), which calls for a comprehensive analysis involving the entire membership of the United Nations, particularly in terms of a review of the functions of and relationship between the various disarmament forums as well as proposals to change the structure of the Secretariat.

7. The aim of any change in the disarmament machinery must be to adapt the organs concerned to the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

8. In accordance with General Assembly decision 47/422:

(a) Member States are invited to provide their views on the report of the Secretary-General no later than 31 January 1993;

(b) The Conference on Disarmament is asked to make recommendations on the future of the report by 15 February 1993;

(c) The Conference on Disarmament is further requested to report on the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February 1993.

9. The foundations of the current international strategy were established by mutual agreement of the Members of the United Nations at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held from 23 May to 1 July 1978. The Final Document of the session includes an introduction to the subject of disarmament, a Declaration (objectives and purposes), a Programme of Action (procedures to ensure compliance with obligations undertaken) and a section on machinery, deliberations and negotiations on international disarmament (to deal with the various aspects of disarmament issues).

10. The priorities established in the 1978 Final Document remain unchanged. Moreover, no member of the international community could deny the validity of the objectives and purposes set forth in the Declaration. All are based on the United Nations Charter, and all have been recognized by us, the Members of the Organization.

11. The dramatic changes which have taken place in international relations in recent years, far from vitiating the Final Document, have led to conditions which are more propitious for ending the arms race. As noted in paragraph 3 of the Final Document: "Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other". There is no doubt that the cold war hindered the proper implementation of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. Yet, at this time of renewed opportunity, there is a need not only to reconfirm its objectives and principles but also to revitalize some aspects of the Programme of Action and disarmament machinery.

12. To revitalize the Programme of Action and the machinery to implement it, it is necessary to follow a procedure similar to that pursued in 1978, in which all States Members of the United Nations will participate and take decisions by mutual agreement. In the area of disarmament, we cannot disregard the principles and norms which have emerged from a long series of initiatives since the very beginnings of the Organization. In common with other questions of importance to the international community, account should not only be taken of recent developments in assessing a particular situation

but also of a historical perspective. Pragmatism in this area offers only a partial perspective in reaching a judgement.

13. The activities proposed in "An Agenda for Peace" (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping) (A/47/277-S/24111) should not be seen as an end in themselves, but as an important complement to the disarmament process that would help in the attainment of longer-lasting agreements. We all know that the fundamental problem has been the lack of political will on the part of some States to commit themselves to genuine disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. And it is precisely in this area that irreversible progress must be made if we are to make the world safer.

14. Disarmament, as understood at the United Nations, encompasses prevention and the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons. In the negotiation of each of these aspects, account has been taken of the political forces shaping international behaviour, which, until the end of the cold war, had prevented any significant advances. The approach proposed by the Secretary-General, in terms of focusing the activities proposed in "An Agenda for Peace" on resolving localized conflicts, could lead to negotiations on every aspect of disarmament, also in a localized setting, and the risk may arise of very different results in different regions. A lack of symmetry in commitments could, at the international level, create more serious problems if attempts are not made to establish similar obligations and responsibilities for all States. A pragmatic approach to disarmament prevents the fundamental problems from being tackled (as in the case of military strategy) and could lead to a cure for the symptoms without a cure for the illness. The would-be use of disarmament measures within a context of compliance with measures to promote peace would require prior agreement on such measures.

15. As noted in the Final Document, "bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament" (para. 121). The globalization of disarmament must represent the sum of bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives, with participation by all States as appropriate. Globalization must be understood as meaning that all States must make a commitment to implement disarmament agreements and measures. The argument that the major military Powers must initiate the process and set an example remains valid.

16. The role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security is defined in the Charter of the United Nations. This role must, however, be seen in the context of the world of the twenty-first century, and the current composition of the Security Council and decision-making must thus be democratized. Similarly, proposals that would permit supposedly humanitarian intervention in the internal affairs of States must be carefully reviewed in the light of the above considerations.

17. There must be broader coordination between the Security Council and the General Assembly in discharging functions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as follows: (a) the work of the Security Council must reflect an awareness that the Council is acting on behalf of

Member States, as stated in Article 24 of the Charter, and not on behalf of its members; (b) there must be transparency in the deliberative and decision-making processes of the Security Council; and (c) Security Council reports to the Secretary-General, both annual and special, must cover more substantive issues with the aim of enriching the debate on such issues.

18. Confidence-building measures are without a doubt an important factor for international security and must be encouraged at all levels. Globalization should be taken to mean that all States have an obligation to commit themselves to instituting it. However, the major military Powers are the ones that must set an example, by accepting globalization first of all, and then, without delay, its establishment.

19. The system of agreements and treaties inherited from the cold war period, among them the 1978 Final Document, actually offers a solid framework within which to make headway on disarmament. The challenge now is not only to put what we have inherited into practice but to complete the work of negotiation on weapons of mass destruction.

20. Nuclear technology cannot be uninvented, but the production of nuclear weapons certainly can and must be prohibited. Their qualitative improvement must also be halted. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons continues to be a priority of the international community. Making gradual reductions in the number and the force of nuclear tests has proven to be an ineffectual approach. It would be a misfortune if the moment for the permanent prohibition of nuclear tests were allowed to slip by, now that the conditions for doing so are so propitious. We must make this a short-term objective.

21. We share the view that "there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction" (A/C.1/47/7, para. 27). The way to turn the logic of non-proliferation into concerted action is by making it truly universal and genuine. The prohibition must extend to the nuclear-weapon States as well. For a system of non-proliferation to work, all States, everywhere, must stop acquiring and perfecting the tools and technologies of mass destruction.

22. The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be given their proper scope, without forgetting the intentions of their authors. The NPT could be extended indefinitely and unconditionally, after ensuring that the aims of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty itself are being complied with. Should that not be the case, it must remain possible to assess compliance with the Treaty, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, before committing permanently to its provisions. Consequently, the 1995 Conference will have to combine the five-year review of the NPT with a discussion of its extension. The preparatory process will have to include substantive discussions on the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in general, as well as on the provisions of the Treaty in particular. The best course would be to have a 10- or 15-year extension, in conjunction with a nuclear disarmament programme, which should be feasible in that period of time.

23. The preparations for the 1995 NPT Conference should also make provision for a dialogue among all States, whether parties to the Treaty or not. This would ensure a gradual laying of the foundations for greater understanding among all of them regarding the main elements of a future universal regime of genuine non-proliferation.

24. Disarmament must continue to focus on nuclear disarmament, precisely because any advances in this area will pave the way for other agreements on other types of weapons.

25. The United Nations must continue to play a central role in the matter of disarmament. Although, to be sure, there are new realities to which we must pay heed, the priorities remain the same. Chief among the new realities are the issue of the destruction and storage of weapons and the conversion of military capacity to peaceful uses once there is compliance with the disarmament and arms limitation agreements of recent years. These problems affect all States because they are bound up with environmental questions and considerable economic adjustments. However, the responsibility is not the same for all States, since the developing countries will merely suffer the consequences. The question of conversion might be one of the tasks that the Security Council could follow closely. In that connection it should be recalled that it is the permanent members of the Security Council that possess the most weapons and are the major weapon-producers.

26. The need for a single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament still applies. The Conference on Disarmament must be maintained in its present form. Experience has demonstrated the difficulties experienced by a negotiating body with a large membership, especially when it works by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament with its almost 40 members has already reached the limit as a negotiating body. The basic problem of its membership is that, if we reconsider the kinds of countries that should belong to the Conference in the light of the new international situation, it is obvious that there are some members that perhaps do not belong there, while not all the States that should be members, are. The waning of tyranny in Europe and the cessation of the East/West military confrontation give us a new perspective on the kind of political balance that should be sought. Two elements will have to be reconciled: keeping Conference membership limited and ensuring the representativeness of its members.

27. The agenda of the Conference on Disarmament should continue to reflect the disarmament priorities. All unnecessary changes should be avoided and an effort should be made to take a proper approach in all items. Concentrating on well-defined and urgent issues is an objective in keeping with the nature of the Conference on Disarmament.

28. The existing disarmament agreements all have their own review and supervisory mechanisms. If the Conference on Disarmament were given those tasks as well, its membership would have to coincide with the parties to the treaties it considered. The Conference has come up against that difficulty each time it has tried to deal with international agreements that do not involve some of its members.

29. The United Nations Secretariat must be strengthened in the field of disarmament so that it can respond appropriately to the mandates given to it by the General Assembly. The tasks have multiplied considerably but, rather than being reinforced, its operations have been downgraded. In 1978 it was agreed to elevate the head of the Department for Disarmament Affairs to the rank of Under-Secretary-General, thus making him independent of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. After having been a Department headed by an Under-Secretary-General, it has now gone back to being an Office for Disarmament Affairs reporting to an Acting Director of comparatively lesser rank. In addition, the Professional staff has been cut back considerably. This situation puts the Office in a position inferior to the one it had in 1978.

30. In short, it is obvious that the new international situation requires the United Nations to act in ways very different from those to which we were accustomed during the cold war. Yet it is also obvious that any change in the points agreed in 1978 requires an equally unanimous decision by the Members of the United Nations. We cannot, in the interests of a so-called pragmatism, twist and change the agreements already concluded in this area. Surely pragmatism is not among the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations? Nor can the Organization be asked to play an increasing part in the settlement of political and military problems at the same time as the Department for Disarmament Affairs is downgraded. Furthermore, as witness the recent experience of various countries of the now defunct Warsaw Pact, it is not an easy task to put disarmament agreements into operation, and it is one that requires experts as well as funds.

31. It would be ideal, of course, to convene a new special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The preparatory work for such a session might, however, drag on, and the current pressing needs do not admit any further postponement of collective decisions. This is why it was decided to have the First Committee of the General Assembly reconvene for a week this March.

32. In order to ensure the success of the First Committee's work on this topic, it would be useful to have the views of the greatest possible number of countries, and also the reports of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, we should have before us a simple chart indicating the former, current and future posts in the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. That would facilitate the First Committee's consideration of the question.

33. Given the scope of the topic and the limited time allotted in March to the First Committee, it would perhaps be advisable to ask the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, to continue his consultations even after the conclusion of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly with a view to achieving the broadest possible agreement among all members of the Assembly.

Nigeria

[Original: English]

[28 January 1993]

1. The Government of Nigeria welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". The paper is a useful complement to the proposals advanced in the "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), particularly with its focus on disarmament as a key element in any consideration of matters relating to international peace and security. Disarmament has always enjoyed pre-eminence in any political security organization. It is a vital element in confidence-building measures amongst States and it is a tool in peacemaking and peace maintenance. More than at any period since the end of the Second World War, the international community has a chance to attain disarmament at all levels and in all weapons systems, especially weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

2. The Government of Nigeria endorses the conceptual themes in the paper of the Secretary-General. Concepts such as integration, globalization and revitalization neatly summarize the major issues on the disarmament agenda and the need to strengthen disarmament machinery.

The agenda for disarmament

3. The Government of Nigeria welcomes the various disarmament measures undertaken in the last few years. The developments have set the stage for further progress in the reduction of weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated conventional weapons. The Government believes that the priority decided in the first special session on disarmament still holds. Accordingly, the disarmament agenda in the post-cold-war era should have at its fore the issue of nuclear arms reduction, nuclear-test ban and concrete steps to eliminate all other weapons of mass destruction. The recently concluded Chemical Weapons Convention is indicative of possible progress in other areas of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The transfer of arms, especially sophisticated weapons with greater lethality, should also be of concern in the post-cold-war era. The international community must make efforts to curb the transfer of arms, particularly to areas of tension and conflict. The activities of illegal arms dealers must also be the focus of attention. While recognizing the importance of resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, Nigeria believes that it is the full implementation of all aspects of the resolution, particularly early expansion of the arms transfer register to include data on military holdings and procurement through national production, that would lead to increased confidence and security among Member States.

The machinery for disarmament

5. The cold war led the United Nations to create interlocking institutions for the discussion and negotiation of disarmament matters. These institutions were the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. While the First Committee serves as a deliberative body where ideas are exchanged and priorities identified, the Disarmament Commission provides a forum for inter-sessional discussion of disarmament matters while the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission also provides a forum for detailed discussion on specific disarmament topics that could not be debated in depth during the annual sessions of the First Committee. The Conference on Disarmament, on the other hand, serves as the forum for negotiating disarmament agreements.

6. Nigeria agrees that these institutions should be reviewed and strengthened in order to make them meet the challenges and opportunities offered by the changing global environment. Reinvigorated and revitalized, these institutions, especially the Conference on Disarmament, should be able to fulfil the role envisaged for them, which is to promote disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament in particular should be allowed gradually to restructure itself to bring it into line with the changing security environment.

7. Any assessment of United Nations disarmament machinery will have to review the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Nigeria is of the view that given the pivotal role of that Office in servicing disarmament meetings and propagating disarmament, the Office should be given resources and prominence to enable it to meet the demands to be placed on it.

8. The Government of Nigeria notes the support of the Secretary-General for greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters. With its wide powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is already involved in disarmament matters. The role of the Security Council, Nigeria believes, is most useful in attaining disarmament under its peace-keeping mandate.

9. The world has the rare opportunity to chart a new course on disarmament and international security. Nigeria believes that all Member States should pursue a path that leads to disarmament, enhanced security and development for all States.

Norway

[Original: English]

[12 February 1993]

1. General

1. Norway welcomes the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" and recognizes the great importance of these questions. Norway shares the basic view expressed in the report, which is that arms control and disarmament are integral aspects of peace-keeping, peacemaking and peace-building.

2. After the end of the cold war and the subsequent dramatic changes in the international political landscape, there is a need to review and revitalize the international machinery for consultations and negotiations on disarmament. The task is to create a disarmament machinery that will provide for a flexible response to changing tasks and challenges in the field of disarmament and international security.

3. Any duplication of effort between the various forums should be avoided. At the same time the future disarmament machinery must be adapted to current economic and political realities. There is scope for greater effectiveness and saving of economic resources.

4. Ongoing disarmament and arms control negotiations may in themselves promote restraint, even before a binding international agreement has been achieved. The negotiation process may also have a policing effect on existing arms control and disarmaments agreements and should help shape international behaviour.

5. Disarmament should in the long term free resources for social and economic development and environmental protection. There are, however, substantial transaction costs associated with disarmament in terms of both re-employment of personnel and conversion of defence industries. These issues are new and important dimensions of arms control and disarmament in the post-cold-war era.

2. Priority items

6. The emerging international consensus on vital security issues should make it possible to achieve further progress on priority items on the international disarmament and arms control agenda. In this context, the following items should be considered:

(a) The implementation of an effective global ban on chemical weapons and biological weapons is a priority issue. The same goes for further reductions of nuclear weapons. A strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty plays a key role in this regard.

(b) A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would prevent further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a sound basis for further reductions in nuclear weapons. Lack of substantial progress on the test-ban issue before the 1995 Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty might have negative consequences for the extension of the duration of the Treaty.

(c) Efforts to halt and reverse regional arms races through greater transparency in armaments, non-proliferation regimes and reduction in arms transfers, and through the introduction of confidence-building measures on a regional scale.

(d) Verification of compliance with existing treaties. This is an important issue, as the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is still very real.

7. The global responsibility of the United Nations of a primarily political nature should be supplemented and strergthened by bilateral and regional agreements. Progress and experience in arms control and confidence-building measures made in one region could be applied to other regions.

3. Conference on Disarmament

8. The Conference on Disarmament has achieved a major result with the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but it has yet to achieve concrete results in other areas. To a large extent, the Conference serves as a forum for prepared policy statements and discussions of the mandates for the various ad hoc committees.

9. There is a need to maintain the Conference on Disarmament as a forum for real negotiations. At the same time efforts should be made to avoid using the Conference solely as a forum for political debates on security and disarmament issues.

10. Transparency in armaments and the question of non-proliferation are important issues for the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body. Another question that should be addressed constructively by the Conference is that of a nuclear-test ban. Since 1976 the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference has done important work on verification of a test-ban treaty. That work should continue. A global seismic verification network would play a key role in this respect.

Enlargement

11. The time has come for an enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament. Expanding its membership would broaden the political basis for the negotiations and enable the Conference to benefit from the experience and contributions of a larger group of nations.

12. Norway supports the proposal to accept as members those States which have applied and shown a genuine interest in the work of the Conference and we believe that a decision to enlarge the Conference on Disarmament should be implemented without further delay.

13. The efforts to enlarge the Conference is now gaining momentum. A continued delay in solving this question could have adverse consequences. It is difficult to imagine that a large number of countries would have the necessary resources to continue to be actively engaged in the work of the Conference as observers if they now were to be denied full membership.

4. First Committee of the General Assembly

14. There are strong reasons for involving the General Assembly in the establishment and maintenance of the general political aims for disarmament and for having a deliberative forum in the United Nations for in-depth discussion of selected items.

15. The First Committee has an important role to play in exchanging views and identifying priorities on the disarmament and international security agenda. During the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, there was for the first time a joint discussion of the disarmament and international security items. The effort to rationalize our work has thus proved to be successful.

16. Further steps should be taken towards rationalization by making the First Committee more goal-oriented. This could be achieved by a continued reduction of the number of resolutions and by shortening the general debate.

5. The United Nations Disarmament Commission

17. Norway has given full support to the reform programme adopted in 1990 with a view to enhancing the functions of the Disarmament Commission. Norway took an active part in this work. The reform package that was adopted has to a certain extent strengthened the role the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body for considering and making proposals in the field of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission has an important part to play in encouraging, supporting and supplementing disarmament negotiations conducted in other multilateral, regional and bilateral forums.

18. Despite the promising developments in the Commission's work after the adoption of the reform programme, further improvements in the structure and functioning of the Disarmament Commission seem necessary. The work of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should be viewed in conjunction. If a consensus is reached to retain the present three-part machinery, the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body should be underlined. We should be careful not to allow the Commission to be transformed into a negotiating body. Its primary functions should continue to be of a deliberative nature.

6. The Office of Disarmament Affairs

19. The First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament are the three bodies that make up the multilateral disarmament machinery. The essential fourth part of the machinery is the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Office was last year downgraded from a department to an office. We trust that the reorganized Office will be given sufficient staff and other resources to allow it to continue to carry out its tasks efficiently, including the United Nations register on arms transfer.

20. The register would promote greater openness and transparency in international arms transfers and help to discourage destabilizing sales. It is important that sufficient resources are made available for the United Nations Secretariat to operate and maintain the register. The Office for Disarmament Affairs should be strengthened as the focal point of the Secretariat in the disarmament field.

21. The branch at Geneva should also have the necessary resources to facilitate the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

7. Conclusion

22. Several weaknesses within the existing institutional framework for disarmament matters have been highlighted in this paper. One major problem seems to be that different forums duplicate each other. This is also the case as regards the people who participate in the various institutional set-ups.

23. Disarmament is now addressed in the United Nations in New York twice a year, for five weeks in the First Committee and for three weeks in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This means in practice that the disarmament experts move their meetings three times a year. There is inevitably substantial overlap in the subjects discussed by the three different bodies, although the approach may be different.

24. The present weaknesses could be avoided by concentrating and rationalizing activities. One possibility that should be considered is concentrating the resources in a restructured Conference on Disarmament and a more smoothly functioning First Committee. The First Committee should at the same time be given the opportunity to conduct a broad political discussion as well as to provide input to the Conference on Disarmament.

25. Analyses, studies and research activities should in future be carried out by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Norway favours a further strengthening of the Institute. At present, the Institute is partly financed by voluntary contributions. The United Nations should increase its contributions to it.

Pakistan

[Original: English]

[29 January 1993]

1. The momentous transformations of recent years have offered opportunities for initiating a meaningful process of global disarmament and establishing a truly just system of international security. Disarmament is possible where insecurity has been eliminated and insecurity is eliminated through the resolution of disputes and conflicts and the creation of mutual trust and confidence among States. On the other hand disarmament itself can contribute to reducing mutual suspicions and insecurity. Therefore, the peace-keeping and peace-building role of disarmament can indeed be significant.

2. The three objectives outlined by the Secretary-General, namely, integration, globalization and revitalization can serve as useful signposts in the pursuit of the endeavour towards general and complete disarmament.

3. The elimination of the spectre of large-scale and permanent damage brought about by weapons of mass destruction and of regional conflicts, which in the past have cumulatively consumed immeasurable precious resources and caused loss of millions of lives, is fundamental to our collective endeavours as we seek to reinvigorate the international disarmament and arms control agenda. The old system of security, which was based on relationships of antagonism and threat of mutual annihilation, must now be replaced by a structure of global security based on cooperation rather than coercion and justice rather than the logic of might.

4. The creation of conditions favourable to the implementation of effective disarmament measures is dependent on the establishment of a framework that ensures the security of all States irrespective of size or strength.

5. The Charter of the United Nations provides immutable principles that must continue to guide future endeavours of the international community in its collective undertakings whether in disarmament or in the enhanced preventive diplomacy functions of the United Nations. In particular, the following principles enshrined in the Charter must strictly be observed:

(a) Refraining from the use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

(b) Non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

(c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples.

6. In the elaboration of concepts associated with the term "arms regulation" further discussions need to take into account the context of recent experience, which has prompted the distinction between arms regulation and disarmament. In terms of the peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building role of the United Nations, arms regulation in recent times has taken the form either of preventing armaments from reaching an aggressor in a situation of international conflict or seeking to disarm parties to an internal conflict as part of peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Disarmament on the other hand is a subject with clearly defined objectives and where the established priorities continue to remain valid. However, progress achieved in important areas, particularly nuclear disarmament and the end of the cold war, underscore the necessity of progress in areas that so far had remained dormant. Regional disarmament is one such priority area.

7. Integration thus requires an approach that seeks to set in motion a process of global disarmament in the nuclear as well as the conventional fields with equal emphasis being placed on regional confidence-building, non-proliferation and disarmament measures in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. Globalization requires changing adversarial relationships into those which guarantee peaceful coexistence. The agenda of the Security Council provides a catalogue of international situations that pose a threat to international peace and security. All too often a lack of political will to resolve disputes on the basis of the provisions of the Charter has caused the continuation of international tensions and insecurity, which in turn impede disarmament.

9. In the context of "globalization", two important considerations underline the reciprocated unilateral measures to which a reference has been made in the Secretary-General's report in connection with measures associated with reductions in tactical nuclear weapons by the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

10. After many years of extensive negotiations, the two countries have a framework that not only made START I possible but also enabled them to adopt reciprocal unilateral measures in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. Understanding of each others' weapons system and greater transparency in techniques and intentions made similarly protracted negotiations unnecessary in the case of START II, which followed soon thereafter.

11. At the regional and subregional levels, reciprocated unilateral measures are both possible and desirable. However, the initiative, in cases where there exist vast military disparities, rests with countries with greater military capabilities and potential.

12. The regional approach to disarmament is now a widely established concept. Pakistan welcomes the recognition in the Secretary-General's report that the trend towards regional approaches to disarmament and confidence-building measures "is to be encouraged" and that there are

"numerous ways in which regional approaches could enhance the process of global arms reduction". Its relevance is particularly pertinent in the region of South Asia.

13. The General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. In June 1991 the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed consultations between the United States, the Russian Federation and China on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other to evolve arrangements for nuclear non-proliferation in the South Asian region. This proposal has been supported by all the proposed participants except one and has been welcomed by the international community.

14. Pakistan also attaches considerable importance to promoting the control and reduction of conventional weapons at the global as well as the regional level. The accumulation of armaments in various regions of the world is the result of a number of factors - unresolved territorial disputes, denial of the right of self-determination, ambitions for regional hegemony by the militarily more significant States, and foreign occupation and military intervention.

15. It is obvious that a serious imbalance in conventional forces in any region will enhance the sense of insecurity and make both conventional arms control and disarmament as well as nuclear non-proliferation more difficult. Pakistan has proposed several measures for arms control and reduction in South Asia, including agreement between India and Pakistan on a mutually agreed reduction of conventional forces.

16. The Secretary-General's report dwells on some aspects of conventional arms control - arms transfers, transparency and other confidence-building measures. We agree with his statement that "production over capacities and surplus equipment in industrialized States are now increasingly feeding arms markets in parts of the developing world". It is, therefore, for the countries that produce armaments to undertake on the one hand to reduce such production and on the other to restrict the sale and transfer of such armaments to other countries. Nevertheless it is essential to bear in mind that arms transfer can either heighten the imbalance in military capability or ameliorate an existing imbalance. Restraints on arms transfers should not heighten the imbalance in certain regions, which would only heighten insecurity and bring closer the threat of conflict.

17. The first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament approved several principles for conventional disarmament that remain relevant today. Among these the most important are the right of every State to self-defence; the right of self-determination; and the need to avoid imbalance in arms levels and capabilities. These principles also stipulate that the most heavily armed States have the greatest responsibilities to promote disarmament measures.

18. With regard to the question of transparency in armaments, the Conference on Disarmament has been entrusted a special responsibility to address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing

accumulation of arms and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to promote openness and transparency. It is our hope that the Conference on Disarmament would be enabled to fulfil its mandate at an early date and is able to evolve agreements in this important field.

19. It is important that the first step must be to ensure the implementation of disarmament agreements that have been concluded or are to be concluded. Pakistan has welcomed the agreements concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. It is our hope that these agreements, which also encompass the other newly independent Republics, will be smoothly and speedily implemented. Yet, we believe that the 3,500 nuclear warheads that will be retained by the United States and the 3,000 warheads that will be retained by the Russian Federation - roughly representing numbers at the time when arms limitation talks between the two countries commenced - would still keep alive the threat of nuclear conflict no matter how remote this may seem at the present time. As the Secretary-General has underlined, our goal must remain to cross the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age. Together with the Biological Weapons Convention, the recently signed Chemical Weapons Convention would serve to eliminate two categories of weapons of mass destruction that should serve to focus due attention on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as well.

20. Pakistan therefore expects that at some stage in the near future it will become possible for the other three nuclear-weapon States to join in the process of a global nuclear disarmament agreement.

21. To match the self-denial of nuclear weapons expected of non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear Powers must categorically indicate their commitment to complete nuclear disarmament. One important indication of this commitment would be the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban treaty - a goal that the international community has sought for nearly three decades. Pakistan does not share the view that a nuclear-test ban should be achieved in a graduated process of decreasing threats. We welcome the moratorium on nuclear testing announced by some nuclear Powers; we hope this will be transformed into a total prohibition. A test ban will stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and also reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

22. Until complete nuclear disarmament is achieved, the nuclear-weapon States are under an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, there is no reason why these assurances should not be extended to all non-nuclear-weapon States in unconditional terms and in a legally binding form.

23. Non-proliferation is the other side of the coin of disarmament. Pakistan shares the view that nuclear proliferation would be destabilizing and would threaten international peace and security. Non-proliferation would be universally accepted if it was pursued on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis. The disparity between nuclear and non-nuclear States in the NPT is well acknowledged. This inequality should not be further exacerbated by

arbitrary and restrictive interpretation of the requirement imposed by NPT on its parties. The NPT's extension clearly will be dependant on the parallel realization of nuclear disarmament.

24. The far-reaching disarmament agreements achieved in recent times have also created new problems, for example ensuring verification of disarmament measures and the actual implementation of the destruction and disposal of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. The disarmament dividend may therefore have to be deferred for some time.

25. Pakistan believes that the United Nations must assume a central role both in the verification and implementation of the disarmament agreements. The United Nations policy in these fields must however be determined in a transparent manner and on a democratic basis.

26. The positive developments accompanying the end of the cold war must not create a false sense of complacency. The world remains divided between the rich and the poor, the weak and the powerful and the oppressed and the oppressor. While there is no danger of a return to the cold war, the demise of a bipolar world and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have released energies that can have both positive and negative implications. The war in Yugoslavia and the national ethnic conflicts taking place in various parts of the world are sombre signals that the world may face new turmoil and turbulence. The depths of deprivation in parts of the world also pose a threat to peace and security.

27. Concerted action is required to address the dangers of ethnic conflicts, oppression, inequality and deprivation, all of which pose enormous challenges to the world community and particularly to the United Nations. Our Organization is being tested today in numerous regions, particularly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where action is needed urgently to help peoples in the most extreme form of distress. The United Nations must respond also to the desire of those peoples who remain under foreign or alien domination to exercise the right of self-determination, as in the case of Kashmir, where the promise of self-determination in the resolutions of the Security Council remains to be fulfilled. Simultaneously, the United Nations is also called upon to preserve international peace and security and to prevent recourse to war by Member States.

28. Unless the United Nations is able to respond credibly to these immediate challenges, its ability to promote a guideline of global disarmament will lack in credibility.

29. The Secretary-General has taken a bold and innovative initiative with a laudable motive. The First Committee will have the opportunity to devote itself in the special session in March 1993 to debate the Secretary-General's report and to review the problems of rationalization and the need for closer linkages between the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the Office of Disarmament Affairs in their common endeavour to promote disarmament, arms control and confidence-building as a contribution to international peace and security.

30. The functioning of the Security Council has been the subject of increased attention in recent years. We welcome the revitalization of the Council, which has enabled it to function more effectively.

31. It is thus natural to expect the Council to play a more determined role in situations where such determination has been lacking. The full realization of the Council's role as envisioned in the Charter for the maintenance of international pece and security through uniform application of the provisions of the Charter is crucial to promoting conditions of global peace and security before new responsibilities can be exercised by it to promote the goals of disarmament.

Peru

[Original: Spanish]

[19 January 1993]

1. Peru expresses its gratitude for the timely and relevant report by the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which was submitted during Disarmament Week in 1992 and whose three central themes - integration, globalization and revitalization - are consistent with the ideas put forward in the statement made by the delegation of Peru in the general debate in the First Committee on 16 October 1992. Peru believes that these three themes could give practical substance to and serve to underpin the new concept of strategy and security, which views international stability as a product of multilateral cooperation for disarmament and development. Such cooperation is an urgent necessity in view of the far-reaching changes which have occurred in the world, the great strides that have been made in several important areas of disarmament, especially in the bilateral sphere, and the new threats, conflicts and uncertainties facing the community of nations at the present stage, as well as the persistence and worsening of social and economic problems. The difficulties associated with the process of world-wide economic reform are greater and more persistent than they were originally thought to be and they have become a key factor affecting international stability. Consequently, never before has the need for an integrated approach to the issues of peace, international security and development been more apparent, as the Secretary-General's report suggests.

2. In its statement, the delegation of Peru identified the simultaneous quest for peace and development as the major challenge to be faced by the international community through the United Nations system, recognizing as it does that security is the indivisible sum of various parts that cannot be dealt with in isolation. Peru maintains that there is an urgent need for effective disarmament measures geared to development and, accordingly, concurs in the Secretary-General's approach and his proposal to integrate disarmament matters and arms regulation, the building of a new system of international relations and the improvement of economic conditions as complementary steps

which must, to the extent possible, be taken in a coordinated way. This is the mandate laid down in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention is an historic achievement, but it must not be an isolated one. The persistent stagnation in multilateral disarmament and the fragility and vulnerability of multilateral disarmament efforts are undeniable facts. Enhanced coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in keeping with the spirit of Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter, would help to overcome this situation and to globalize and revitalize multilateral disarmament efforts. All Member States have an obligation to do their part in this regard.

4. Although some significant achievements have been made at the international level with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and at the regional level with respect to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the single most urgent task continues to be halting and reversing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Controlling the arms trade, in which there has been an upsurge, and achieving the lowest possible level of armaments are also urgent necessities.

5. In December 1991, on the proposal of Peru, the Presidents of the Andean countries approved the Cartagena Declaration, prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction. This innovative initiative and other equally important initiatives adopted by the militarily significant States of South America could make the region a model for efforts to control proliferation.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]

[18 January 1993]

1. The State of Qatar welcomes the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/C.1/47/7. It is particularly concerned that measures for the limitation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction should be extended to the Middle East region and that all parties in the region should accede to the relevant international instruments, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, so as to open the way for the accession of all countries in the region to the other agreements relating to weapons of mass destruction and especially the Convention on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

2. The State of Qatar particularly welcomes the Secretary-General's statement that proposed controls should be balanced and fair and that they should not divide the world into the two invidious categories of "haves" and "have-nots".

Sweden

[Original: English]

[9 February 1993]

1. The report of the Secretary-General is an important document in a period of fundamental change in the field of international security. The report is a useful basis for analysing the implications of the new international situation for disarmament in general, and the role of the United Nations in this field in particular. Sweden is in full agreement with the thrust of the observations and ideas put forward in the report.

2. It is important that disarmament and arms regulation issues be integrated into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. A globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament is needed.

3. Security can less than ever be considered an exclusively military matter. The international community now applies a broader concept, linking security with ethnic, economic, social and ecological problems, and the complex relations between them. This concept of security has been central, for example, to the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

4. The world is no longer divided by a bipolar, ideological conflict. Today a new security architecture is emerging, a multipolar structure that is complex and includes growing militant nationalism. Disarmament is no longer a question of bilateral agreements between nuclear super-Powers. Today nations can, on a more equal footing, set the agenda for negotiations that provide a historic opportunity for disarmament. This requires multilateral and global negotiations, within the framework of the United Nations.

5. Disarmament and non-proliferation are cornerstones in the work of the United Nations, closely linked to the substance of the report of the Secretary-General "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), covering preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. Thus, disarmament goals must be pursued in parallel with other political and economic issues.

6. After the cold war, the main threat to mankind is no longer a massive confrontation between two heavily armed nuclear Powers. Today, the proliferation of weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction, constitutes a growing challenge to international peace and security.

7. For decades, non-proliferation has been on the international agenda, particularly as regards weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have a special potential for escalating local conflicts, which may get out of control and result in unpredictable threats to peace and security. The highest priority should now be given to the non-proliferation of such weapons.

8. Needless to say, disarmament and proliferation controls should not unduly hinder the peaceful uses of science and technology.

9. It is also vital to control trade in essential components, equipment and weapon materials, such as uranium and plutonium. It is of equal importance, in the process of nuclear disarmament and conversion, to ensure that know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction is directed to peaceful purposes.

10. The initiatives to establish science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev are good examples of a constructive approach to this problem.

11. Recent drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals constitute a watershed in the post-war history of disarmament and arms control. The conclusion of the START II agreement confirms the determination of the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate the most destabilizing class of strategic weapons, multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles.

12. The two START agreements should be ratified without delay by all parties concerned, in order to ensure real nuclear disarmament.

13. All States with nuclear weapons on their territory or States with significant nuclear programmes must adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The commitments of the parties to the Treaty will be decisive in the work to prepare successfully the NPT Review Conference in 1995 and to provide for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

14. The signing in January this year in Paris of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a historic event, eliminating a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention, in particular its important system of verification, sets an example with regard to biological weapons as well as to nuclear weapons.

15. Openness and transparency are fundamental confidence-building measures. An essential instrument to this end is the United Nations register of conventional arms, established by the General Assembly in 1991. The Assembly has requested that the Conference on Disarmament address the issue of destabilizing accumulations of arms and that it elaborate practical means to increase transparency and openness in this field.

16. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has raised concern for the increased risk of clandestine transfers of conventional weapons. There is also a risk of such trade in weapons of mass destruction. It is essential to minimize the risk of an increase in unofficial sales of military arsenals, particularly to areas of high political tension. Strong and determined action must be taken in order to protect borders, not least new borders, and to ensure full control and openness in this respect.

17. Wherever possible, new mechanisms should be established to serve as "early warning systems", ensuring openness and transparency, indicating where and when national, or international, action is warranted. To this end, new

instruments in addition to traditional methods of promoting disarmament could be pursued, with the aim of strengthening national administrative and legislative systems for effective border and customs control.

18. Verified disarmament agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, can provide early warning of situations that may require the attention of the United Nations. The register of conventional arms may, particularly with an expanded scope, support action of the organization at different stages of conflict resolution. The activities of the Security Council following its resolution 687 (1991) concerning Iraq demonstrate the role disarmament can play in enforcement action.

19. Verified disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation can thus play a crucial role in supporting the work of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.

20. Regional disarmament arrangements can reinforce global agreements and strengthen political settlements in conflict areas. The United Nations can play an important role in facilitating regional disarmament, in promoting international peace and security and in promoting economic development as well as disarmament undertakings.

Machinery

21. The various organs of the United Nations have complementary roles to play in arms control and disarmament.

22. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and is empowered to take action accordingly, on behalf of the Member States. Special functions for the Council are foreseen in existing disarmament agreements, including the Chemical Weapons Convention. A hitherto unique disarmament role has been played by the Security Council in the implementation of its resolution 687 (1991), through action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council may well come to play an increasingly active role, for example, in nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

23. The General Assembly through its First Committee is a forum for normative discussions and resolutions. The United Nations Disarmament Commission should be an instrument for a more focused debate on a limited number of topics, in preparation of proper negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, or, as appropriate, in relevant regional contexts. The general division of labour between the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament is in broad terms well established in theory. However, in practice, there is a generally recognized need to continue to improve the working methods of the three organs. The objective should be to ensure efficiency and to avoid duplications of work.

24. The First Committee is involved in a process of considering its working methods. An urgent task would be to restructure and streamline the agenda of the Committee. Related substantive issues should be dealt with in clusters

under one heading, irrespective of the origin of the item covering, that is, nuclear issues, confidence-building measures and transparency, nuclear-weapon-free zones and regional disarmament. A number of topics could be dealt with on a bi- or tri-annual basis. It should thus be possible to reduce substantially the number of agenda items and resolutions of the Committee, facilitating its deliberations on priority issues. The Committee could furthermore terminate its consideration of clearly obsolete items.

25. The working methods and agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission have recently been reformed. Further steps should be taken to allow the Commission to focus more in depth on important items and submit concrete recommendations thereon. Sweden has proposed a new such item, "General guidelines for non-proliferation with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction". As a practical step to rationalizing the functioning of the Commission and avoiding duplication with the First Committee, the Commission could consider suspending the practice of having a general exchange of views.

26. During the last few years, the Conference on Disarmament has focused largely on negotiations on the Convention on Chemical Weapons. Having accomplished this task, the Conference must now devote its attention to other issues of substance, relevant in a post-cold-war era.

27. For the near future the Conference on Disarmament should concentrate its efforts on four main areas:

(a) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be given the highest priority. A nuclear-test ban is an important element in this context. So is transparency and control regarding transfers of nuclear technology and sensitive expertise and a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities.

(b) Intensified efforts are required to address the problems of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms, in particular to areas of high political tension.

(c) In the new security environment, confidence-building measures are crucial for the maintenance of peace and stability. Such measures can be developed in many different areas, that is, conventional and nuclear arms and outer space.

(d) The Conference on Disarmament should consider initiating deliberations on regional security arrangements. The Conference could serve as a forum for the exchange of information and experience in this field and promote regional security arrangements.

28. It is doubtful if the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate form to serve as a permanent review and supervisory body for existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements, as its membership is in practice not identical to the parties to any given agreement.

29. The composition of the Conference does not correspond to the present political map. Today, there are more countries with observer status than members of the Conference, a sign of growing interest amongst nations in taking part in multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The Conference should respond to these developments.

30. The efficiency of the Conference could be greatly improved by a modification of the consensus rule, at least as regards procedural matters. One country should not use the consensus rule to prevent the Conference from considering an issue that an overwhelming majority of States wish to address.

31. In the Conference on Disarmament, a conclusive debate on procedure is essential but should not block progress on issues of substance.

32. The Office of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat is likely to face increasing tasks with the implementation and probable expansion, inter alia, of the register of conventional arms. It should be given adequate resources to fulfil such functions, as the need may arise.

33. In a post-cold-war era disarmament agreements have been concluded that it would have been impossible to imagine only a few years ago. It is essential that the United Nations, through its various forums, use the momentum to achieve progress and results on major issues of disarmament and non-proliferation.

34. The forthcoming reconvened meetings of the First Committee will provide a valuable opportunity to address the issues of the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. The report of the Secretary-General provides a useful starting-point for this reassessment.

Tunisia

[Original: French]

[30 January 1993]

1. Tunisia has considered the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" and has noted with interest his approach based on the three concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization.

2. Tunisia supports this approach, which is consistent with the idea now shared by the entire international community that disarmament is no longer the concern of a few States but a responsibility to be shared by all.

3. Although the build-up and maintenance of military arsenals and the qualitative and quantitative improvement of weapons during the cold war era resulted from and even supported the bipolar division of the world, it is difficult today to accept the concept of military deterrence which the world's major military Powers established as their policy.

4. Accordingly, we believe that the time has come to link the global disarmament process closely with the acceptance by all States, on an equal footing, of the concept of arms control. Indisputably, such control should be based on the principle of negotiation and should take into account the priorities established in 1978 at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament.

5. To integrate disarmament into the new international order, several factors that could be described as enhancing international security in the broad sense of the term must be taken into consideration. From this viewpoint, we agree with the Secretary-General that the process of global disarmament should be closely coordinated with international efforts which are being or should be deployed in other fields. We would note in particular the need to focus on improving economic and social conditions in areas where instability arises out of economic imbalances, excessive debt, and deteriorating terms of trade. In "An Agenda for Peace" these factors were rightly cited as sources of conflict and tension on a local, regional and, consequently, international scale.

6. Concerted measures must be taken without delay in order to facilitate global support for the disarmament process, which is more likely to proceed rapidly once all the favourable conditions are brought together. In fact, this approach corresponds to the shared conviction that the advent of an international system for peace is intimately linked to other economic, social and human concerns.

7. On the subject of globalization, we agree without reservation that disarmament is the concern of all. It therefore follows that the globalization of the disarmament process requires a non-compartmentalized view of the areas in which such action should be taken. The negotiations taking place at the bilateral, regional and international levels should be based on a non-selective approach to areas of action. This is more consistent with the close relationship that exists between the various aspects of disarmament and international security.

8. Tunisia, which is a party to all treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament and was among the first signatories of the new Convention on Chemical Weapons, firmly believes that multilateral treaties and arrangements are fundamental to confidence-building. We would note, however, that the tendency to focus international attention on certain areas of disarmament at the expense of others of equal or even greater importance is likely to perpetuate "<u>à la carte</u>" disarmament, whereas selectivity or partiality ought to be avoided entirely.

9. This tendency is even more disturbing in view of the choices made by certain States regarding areas of disarmament. We therefore hope that all nuclear-weapon States, especially those in the Middle East region that have not yet done so, will become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and subscribe to the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that a treaty banning nuclear testing in all environments will be prepared without delay.

10. Furthermore, in order to be truly effective and to permit the establishment of a real atmosphere of trust at the international level, all arms control and limitation measures should be balanced, fair and duly negotiated within appropriate frameworks such as the Conference on Disarmament, whose enlargement we support. In order for this proven forum for negotiation to become more effective and credible, it is imperative that it be open to all contributions and listen to all concerns. Firmly convinced of this fact, Tunisia has officially expressed its desire to become a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Turkey

[Original: English]

[2 February 1993]

1. The Government of Turkey welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). Turkey considers it as a sign of the United Nations determination to contribute to disarmament efforts in line with the readiness the Security Council displayed during its summit meeting in January 1992.

2. Indeed, after the end of the cold war, the international landscape characterized for so long by ideological confrontation and nuclear stalemate has been dramatically altered, making it possible to establish new and cooperative patterns of international behaviour. In this context, Turkey believes that the conceptual approaches outlined in the report - integration, globalization and revitalization - can constitute the basis for an enhanced international effort in the field of disarmament and arms regulations. The present period offers a historic opportunity for making achievable these goals by concerted and well-oriented action.

I. Integration: disarmament in the new international environment

3. Turkey considers disarmament and the arms regulation process as important elements for international peace and mutual confidence between States. It considers these elements an integrated process encompassing all the multiple components of the military balance. Disarmament should be perceived as a means of achieving peace and not as an end in itself. As stated by the Secretary-General:

> "Disarmament should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields and should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations."

The idea emphasizing the complementarity of disarmament, the structuring of new international relations and the improvement of economic conditions is highly commendable.

4. Although in the last two years, weapons-control and weapons-inspection mechanisms have proved their importance in the implementation of Security Council resolutions for some United Nations-brokered settlements, Turkey feels that a distinction should be made between the forceful demilitarization measures applied in connection with specific conditions and the global disarmament process. It would be more correct to perceive disarmament efforts in this new international order as international legal arrangements that could only succeed through global negotiations open to the participation of all interested States.

II. Revitalization: building on past achievements

5. The world is witnessing unprecedented developments in nuclear arms control and disarmament at least as it relates to the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on 3 January 1992, which calls on these two Powers to eliminate three quarters of their nuclear arsenals, including the elimination of their multi-warhead land-based missiles, is the latest example of a series of welcome developments. Nevertheless, Turkey believes that the nuclear threat continues to remain a first priority on the disarmament agenda. Especially at a time when the risk of the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons and technology is on the rise, preventive measures that effectively defer and, where necessary, penalize this spread should require urgent attention.

6. On nuclear non-proliferation, Turkey considers the NPT a key multilateral disarmament agreement. Turkey holds the view that at the NPT Conference in 1995, contracting parties must explore all the avenues that would give greater effectiveness to the Treaty by giving priority to its indefinite extension. Such a decision should be coupled by steps to develop further the Treaty's verification regime and to promote universal adherence to it.

7. In connection with the nuclear-test ban, while supporting the idea that presents "gradual and significant reduction in the number and yield of tests as an option which should be encouraged in a progressive move towards a total ban on nuclear testing", Turkey also believes that the time is ripe for the Disarmament Conference to initiate a serious examination of the possibilities of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

III. New machinery

8. Turkey strongly supports the Secretary-General's assessment underlying the necessity of a reassessment of the United Nations machinery for disarmament matters, which was created in the course of the cold war.

9. Financial implications as well as technical difficulties of creating a new mechanism lead us to focus more on the existing machinery for its further adaptation to meet the new challenges. The process initiated in the First Committee to rationalize its work and streamline its agenda was a step in the right direction. Turkey is also satisfied by similar positive achievements in

the Disarmament Commission. It considers also that it is the right time for the Disarmament Conference to reflect on some important aspects of its work. Turkey's strongly held view is that the Conference on Disarmament should recognize the profound changes that have taken place in world politics. In line with these changes, it is necessary to adjust its priorities and its composition and to redesign its agenda. The radical and far-reaching developments taking place in the world compel the international community to look for a much wider participation and burden-sharing in the Conference so as to meet the objective of working out a comprehensive disarmament programme with more universal participation. Ways and means of opening up the Conference to other members of the international community who are prepared to contribute effectively to its activities should be seriously considered.

10. The Conference on Disarmament should also focus more sharply on more pragmatic objectives in order to address the issues of immediate security of concern for all States.

11. In conclusion, the Government of Turkey considers the report of the Secretary-General as a valuable stocktaking paper on the current state of disarmament efforts, providing a realistic diagnosis concerning current problems and requirements.

12. Turkey is convinced that the report will provide a solid framework for the future activities of the United Nations in the disarmament field and hopes that it will be further elaborated and complemented by "food for thought" for guiding the international community in the area of disarmament.

Yugoslavia

[Original: English]

[2 February 1993]

1. The general approach of the Secretary-General in his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" is fully acceptable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2. However, the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to make the following comments:

(a) Paragraph 13 of the report speaks of "peace enforcement" as a disarmament measure. That thesis is very dubious. It is linked to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 related to Iraq after its military defeat in the war against multinational forces and its withdrawal from Kuwait. It should be pointed out that every conflict is specific and requires specific solutions of the Security Council whereby only the aggressor is subject to the obligation to reduce arms to the minimum necessary for the protection of the order and for self-defence. After all, the resolution has not solved the problem of disarmament by force in the case of Iraq, except

some assumed nuclear installations and substantial parts of armoured/mechanized and artillery units have been destroyed with great losses in men and personnel.

(b) As regards disarmament, priority should be accorded to political and other non-military means and negotiations. The United Nations should, therefore, take actions aimed at reducing and banning the proliferation and transfer of certain types of weapons as well as certain actions in the field of transparency and conversion mentioned further in the report.